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Jackson Pollock, Blue Poles:  Number 11, 1952, National Gallery of Art, Canberra, Australia 
“A poem should not mean but be.” 
Archibald MacLeish, “Ars Poetica” (1926) 
“No ideas but in things” 
William Carlos Williams, “A Sort of a Song” (in The Wedge, 1944) 
INTRODUCTION 
We have it on the highest authority—Justice Souter writing for a unanimous 
Court in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston—that 
the paintings of Jackson Pollock are “unquestionably shielded” by the First 
Amendment.1  Of course we probably knew that from the development of obscenity 
 
 *  William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  This Essay is the result of 
a conversation several years ago with Charles Fried.  It has benefited from sustained conversations with 
Rebecca Tushnet.  In addition, I thank the students in a reading group on Art and the First Amendment, 
(Fall Term, 2010), for helping me think through the issues addressed here, participants in a seminar at 
Brown University offered by Corey Brettschneider, and Randall Bezanson, Glenn Cohen, Richard 
Fallon, Martha Minow, L. Michael Seidman and Rebecca Zeitlow for their comments on earlier 
versions. 
 1. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).  See 
also Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1060–62 (9th Cir. 2010) (relying on Hurley to 
support the conclusion that tattooing is an activity covered by the First Amendment regardless of 
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law, driven as it was by a need to ensure that the proscription of obscenity not lead 
to the suppression of depictions that are merely erotic.2  Beyond authority, though, 
exactly why are Pollock’s paintings covered by the First Amendment?3  Consider 
that core First Amendment doctrine places under close scrutiny statutes that 
regulate speech based on its content, and, under even closer scrutiny, statutes that 
regulate speech based on the viewpoint it expresses.  Yet, what exactly—or even 
roughly—is the content of Pollock’s Blue Poles, No. 11, or the viewpoint it 
expresses?4 
This Essay explores the question of the First Amendment’s coverage of 
nonrepresentational art, which proves quite difficult to answer satisfactorily—that 
is, in a doctrinal form that preserves other seemingly “unquestionable” results.5  
Every approach one might take to explaining why the First Amendment covers 
art—that art is communicative, that it contributes to the creation of a culture of self-
directed individuals and others I address—generates odd anomalies.6  The 
exploration does not question the conventional conclusion that the First 
Amendment covers artwork, but rather worries some of the often-unstated 
assumptions that underlie that conclusion.7  We will see, for example, that some 
 
whether the tattoos are composed of words or are merely decorative). 
 2. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 150–54. 
 3. For a discussion of the term “coverage,” see infra text accompanying notes 21–27.  Using the 
phrase “not protected by the First Amendment,” the Court has held that the First Amendment does not 
cover recreational dancing.  City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).  See also Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2010) (using the phrases “qualify for First Amendment 
protection” and “confer First Amendment protection” to refer to coverage); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[D]ancing as aerobic exercise is likewise outside the 
First Amendment’s concern.”).  I wonder whether the Court’s treatment of recreational dancing in 
Stanglin would be the same today after the commercial success of “Dancing with the Stars.” 
 4. Much of the secondary literature on art and the First Amendment assumes art’s coverage and 
derives First Amendment rules to deal with specific problems such as the permissible scope of 
regulation of public art (art owned by public agencies) or of regulation of commercial transactions in art, 
particularly in public places.  For an important discussion of the First Amendment’s coverage of art, see 
RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2009).  Marci Hamilton argues for giving 
nonrepresentational art “stringent First Amendment protection” as a means of “protecting vital spheres 
of personal freedom.”  Marci Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. REV. 73, 77–78 (1996).  See also Janet 
Elizabeth Haws, Architecture as Art? Not in My Neocolonial Neighborhood:  A Case for Providing First 
Amendment Protections to Expressive Residential Architecture, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1625 (2005) (arguing 
that expressive architecture should be covered by the First Amendment by analogy to art’s coverage). 
 5. I attempt to keep as close to the doctrinal ground as possible in this Essay, doing my best to 
avoid controversial accounts of how art “works,” although I suspect that complete abstinence from art 
theory is impossible.  See infra note 166 (linking “reader-response” theory to Hurley).  For an example 
of insightful analysis relying on art theory, see Sheldon Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic 
Theory:  The Beautiful, the Sublime, and the First Amendment, 1987 WIS. L. REV. 221 (1987). 
 6. L. Michael Seidman suggested to me that the problem I worry over in this Essay is similar to 
a problem familiar to those who try to figure out exactly why religion is protected distinctively in our 
constitutional system.  See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE:  THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).  I find the suggestion thought-provoking 
and am inclined to agree, but clearly this Essay is not the place to explore the similarities and differences 
between the subjects. 
 7. I use “worry” in the sense of one “get[ting] or bring[ing] into a specified condition by . . . 
dogged effort.”  20 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 571 (John Simpson & Edmund Weiner eds., 2d ed. 
1989) sharply in connection with nonrepresentational art but they arise in connection with many 
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things one might want to say about the question of whether the First Amendment 
covers nonrepresentational art8 lead to the suggestion, implicit in Archibald 
MacLeish’s observation about poetry, that James Joyce’s Ulysses might not be 
covered, surely a peculiar result.9  I do not mean to question Hurley’s assertion 
about Jackson Pollock’s paintings.  Rather, I believe that by asking how that 
conclusion might be justified, we will come across some unexpected facets of the 
First Amendment, with some implications for other doctrinal areas abutting the 
First Amendment.10 
Part I of this Essay raises and briefly addresses some of the most common 
immediate responses when one questions art’s First Amendment coverage, 
suggesting that the questions are indeed more complicated than immediate 
responses suggest.  Part II begins to flesh out the reasons why the immediate 
responses discussed in Part I are at least incomplete.  It sets out some preliminary 
questions, such as the distinction between First Amendment coverage and First 
Amendment protection, and addresses the role of communication in the First 
Amendment and in artworks.  It uses a recently decided case to indicate why we 
cannot finesse the coverage question by displacing it with routine conclusions that 
artworks are covered but not protected, and concludes with some cautionary notes 
about the methodology of the First Amendment argument.  Part III examines why 
First Amendment theory has taken artworks’ coverage for granted, despite the 
difficulty of fitting such works into general First Amendment theories.  I believe 
that examining why nonrepresentational art is covered by the First Amendment 
raises deep questions about First Amendment doctrine, and that general First 
Amendment theories are unlikely to be particularly helpful in addressing those 
questions because they are too general. 
Part IV takes up the Supreme Court’s stated doctrine as relevant to the coverage 
issue, including an analysis of the cases and, importantly, the inadequacy of textual 
analysis to resolve the coverage issue.  Examining the question of art’s coverage in 
 
representational works as well.  For a discussion of representational art, see infra note 181 and 
accompanying text.  I attempt here to avoid the question of determining what counts as art, using as 
examples works that I believe are by consensus regarded as serious and indeed important works of late 
Twentieth Century art.  I occasionally use examples drawn from photography, which, as graphic art, 
raises some of the basic questions I explore here, even though the photographs I use as examples are 
representational.  The basic definitional question is posed, for example, by the activity of hairstyling, 
which, from the perspective of the stylist—and often from an observer’s perspective as well—has many 
of the characteristics of standard art forms. 
8.  See, e.g., BLOW DRY (IMF Internationale Medien und Film GmbH & Co. Produktions KG 
2001); YOU DON’T MESS WITH THE ZOHAN (Happy Madison Productions 2008). 
 9. Cf. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses”, 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d 72 
F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1934) (holding that Ulysses is not obscene and allowing its importation). 
 10. In his comments on a draft of this Essay, Richard Fallon observed correctly that it combines 
an acceptance of conventional conclusions with arguments that subvert the most obvious assumptions 
that would support those conclusions, without replacing those assumptions with other premises—for 
example, premises drawn from deep theorizing about art—that might do so.  Without getting into 
equally deep issues about legal thought, I merely express my view that such a combination constitutes a 
valuable form of internal criticism of legal doctrine, and can be the beginning of what I would call a 
critical legal studies approach to the issue.  See also infra note 213 (sketching my reasons for inclining 
against First Amendment coverage for art). 
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largely doctrinal terms may help us understand questions about the First 
Amendment’s coverage (or absence of coverage) for commercial speech and 
misleading advertising, for example.  In working toward an answer I hope to avoid 
deep philosophical inquiries into the philosophy of language or art,11 hoping 
instead to offer answers to some parts of the question that can be accepted by 
people who disagree about deep theories of language and art.12  The Part also 
suggests some doctrinal implications of finding artworks covered, particularly with 
respect to intellectual property law.  The Conclusion offers a modest reconstruction 
of Hurley’s observation about the unquestionable coverage of Jackson Pollock’s 
paintings, and points out that the Essay’s analysis leaves many questions open to 
further exploration. 
I.  SOME INCOMPLETE, IMMEDIATE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION 
OF FIRST AMENDMENT COVERAGE FOR ARTWORKS 
Three “easy” answers are typically offered when one raises the questions of 
artworks’ First Amendment coverage.  The first, and least cogent, is that regulation 
of artworks on the basis of their “content” is characteristic of totalitarian regimes, 
as seen in Nazi Germany’s suppression of “degenerate” art and Soviet Russia’s 
promotion of socialist realist art at the expense of abstraction.13  The ready 
response to this is that it confuses a symptom of totalitarianism with its causes.  
Totalitarianism is bad because it does many bad things, not (merely) because it 
suppresses art on the basis of its content.  Many constitutional provisions, including 
the First Amendment, limit the bad things totalitarian governments try to do, and it 
is hardly clear that stopping them from suppressing art on the basis of its content 
has anything to do with stopping them from doing the bad things that make them 
totalitarian.  Or, put another way, if a city council prohibited the display of a Claes 
Oldenburg sculpture on private property—where the sculpture is visible to the 
 
 11. Cf. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing 
among artworks “without recourse to principles of aesthetics”).  Before Mastrovincenzo, Bery v. City of 
New York held that street vendors selling paintings and photographs could invoke the First Amendment, 
and that the street vendor regulations did not survive intermediate scrutiny.  97 F.3d 689, 698–99 (2d 
Cir. 1996).  Mastrovincenzo applied intermediate scrutiny and upheld the application of the regulations 
to those who sold decorated T-shirts.  435 F.3d at 100.  For a discussion of these cases, see generally 
Genevieve Blake, Expressive Merchandise and the First Amendment in Public Fora, 34 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1049 (2007). 
 12. I believe that much constitutional doctrine is animated by a search for this sort of overlapping 
consensus where, to use Rawlsian terms, each specific First Amendment principle is supported by 
diverse First Amendment theories, rather than a free-standing doctrine.  I acknowledge, though, that 
overlapping consensus, much less free-standing doctrine, may be unavailable here (as elsewhere). 
 13. I use scare quotes here because the term “content based” is characteristic of First Amendment 
discourse, whereas the question to be explored is whether these regulations deal with materials covered 
by the First Amendment.  One would not ordinarily say that a contractual provision limiting a person’s 
ability to compete with her former employer is “content-based,” although in some sense it is.  However 
we describe such contracts, the underlying question is whether the First Amendment places some special 
limits on the state’s power to regulate them—as of course it does not.  So too with artworks, the 
underlying question is:  Does the First Amendment place special limits on a government’s ability to 
regulate an artwork because in the government’s view it is ugly? 
(1) Tushnet 3/20/2012  1:14 PM 
2012] ART AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 173 
public—because it thought the sculpture was silly, we are unlikely to find 
contemporary equivalents of Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin lurking in the bushes.14 
 
 
Claes Oldenburg, Spoonbridge and Cherry (1985–1988) 
Minneapolis Sculpture Garden, Walker Art Center, Minneapolis 
 
A second, seemingly more substantial easy answer is that many activities that 
are not covered by the First Amendment provoke the imagination and encourage 
people to think.15  Running a small business, for example, does this.  The proprietor 
has to identify a market niche, devise a marketing strategy and more.  Further, 
people who observe small businesses in operation have their imaginations 
provoked.  I will recurrently use the example of ticket scalping as such a small 
business.  The public interest in regulating ticket scalping, while sufficient to 
satisfy modern requirements of economic due process, is thin enough that adding 
even a slight increment to the required justification—that ticket scalping might 
implicate First Amendment concerns, such as provoking the imagination—might 
 
 14. Such a regulation is “content-based.”  Whether the city council could justify such a ban by 
asserting that the sculpture distracts drivers or lowers property values raises separate questions, 
addressed below.  See infra text accompanying notes 60–67.  On the possibility of distraction from 
viewing “art” works, see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214–5 (1975) (holding 
unconstitutional a city ordinance declaring it a public nuisance to show films at a drive-in movie 
showing nudity, where the screen is visible from a public street). 
 15. Cf. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2011) 
(“[T]he value of autonomy extends not merely to the speech of persons but also to the actions of 
persons.”). 
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lead to the conclusion that prohibiting ticket scalping is unconstitutional under the 
First Amendment.16 
Pointing in the other direction, the third easy response is that the coverage 
question is largely inconsequential because governments in the United States rarely 
attempt to regulate artworks based on their content.17  Rather, they seek to apply 
content-neutral regulations that are widely applicable to many activities to artworks 
that happen to present the same social problems as those other activities.18  And, in 
general, the Supreme Court’s standards for determining when a generally 
applicable regulation can be applied to material plainly covered by the First 
Amendment are rather easy to satisfy.19  The conclusion is that we can treat 
artworks as covered by the First Amendment without seriously jeopardizing 
regulations that serve good social ends—and that, when the Court’s standards are 
not satisfied, we should not be troubled by denying the government the ability to 
regulate the artwork.  A full response to this easy answer will occupy substantial 
space below, and a shorthand version will have to suffice at this point.  We can 
reverse course and say that treating artworks as not covered by the First 
Amendment will have few adverse consequences because of the Supreme Court’s 
standards, and that it indeed might be a matter of concern that, for example, the 
First Amendment might be interpreted in a way that places some artworks outside 
the scope of historic preservation ordinances.20  At the least, doing so raises 
questions about whether the courts should say that the social value of artworks 
trumps legislative judgments about historic preservation. 
The easy answers, I think, are unavailing.  We must develop a more 
complex analysis. 
II.  PRELIMINARIES:  WONDERING WHY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
COVERS ART 
A.  COVERAGE VERSUS PROTECTION 
First Amendment analysis conventionally distinguishes between the question of 
whether some activity is covered by the First Amendment and the question of 
 
 16. Briefly on the justifications for prohibiting ticket scalping:  The prohibition prima facie 
prevents people who value seeing a performance highly from purchasing tickets from ticket holders who 
value doing so less highly.  Ticket scalpers are not exploiting “needs” in any interesting sense.  There 
does not seem to be a strong distributional interest at stake and, to the extent that there is one, banning 
ticket scalping is ineffective absent price controls on tickets.  Public interest in preventing relatively 
impecunious fans of Lady Gaga from voluntarily exchanging their tickets for large amounts of cash 
from richer fans is quite unclear to me, and not obviously consistent with underlying values favoring 
equitable distribution of social goods.  And, to the extent that performers are concerned about their 
relatively impecunious fans, they can impose restrictions on access to tickets. 
 17. The closest example of regulation based on content involves denial of subsidies because of 
the content of artworks.  See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); 
Brooklyn Inst. Of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 18. For a compilation of such cases, see Haws, supra note 4. 
 19. For a discussion of those standards, see infra text accompanying note 60. 
 20. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying note 62. 
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whether that activity, if covered, is protected by the First Amendment.21  First 
Amendment analysis is simply irrelevant to activities not covered by the First 
Amendment.22  Consideration of whether a regulation is content-based or content-
neutral, for example, is not appropriate for activities not covered by the First 
Amendment.23 
When activities are covered by the First Amendment, we have to apply standard 
First Amendment doctrine to assess the constitutionality of regulations applicable 
to those activities.  Sometimes activities covered by the First Amendment are also 
protected by it, but sometimes covered activities are unprotected.  Assume that 
nonrepresentational art is covered by the First Amendment.  Consider the 
Oldenburg example described above.24  Perhaps the ban is content-based because it 
is justified with reference to the asserted ugliness or silliness of those sculptures.  
And if—as most advocates of the view that the First Amendment covers art 
believe—nonrepresentational art is a category that receives something more than 
low-level protection against content-based regulations, then the municipal 
regulation would be constitutional only were it justified by substantially strong 
 
 21. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment:  A Play in Three Acts, 34 
VAND. L. REV. 265, 270–71 (1981) (describing the distinction).  For an early Supreme Court decision 
supporting the coverage/protection distinction, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–
72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”).  For a discussion of 
the coverage/protection distinction in constitutional law generally, sometimes described as a distinction 
between defining a right and determining whether an infringement on that right is justified, see David L. 
Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Governmental Interests:  Madisonian Principles versus 
Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1522–23 (1992).  For a treatment in the context of the 
European Court of Human Rights, see Janneke Gerards & Hanneke Senden, The Structure of 
Fundamental Rights and The European Court of Human Rights, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 619 (2009).  For a 
treatment from a jurisprudential perspective, see ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS 35–37 (Julian Rivers trans., Oxford University Press 2002). 
 22. Other constitutional provisions may be.  Suppose we conclude, for example, that “dwarf 
tossing,” understood by the participants and observers as performance art, is not covered by the First 
Amendment.  The participants might mount other constitutional claims against a ban on the activity, 
such as a libertarian-sounding claim that the ban violates a right protected by the Due Process Clause to 
engage in consensual and nonharmful activities.  The United Nations Human Rights Committee has 
issued a report concluding that a ban on dwarf tossing does not violate various human rights, including 
the right to earn a living and the right to respect for private life.  Human Rights Comm., Views of the 
Human Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 75th Sess., July 15, 2002, Commc’n No. 854/1999 (July 26, 
2002), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/09d49050a9b34aaac1256c6e0031b919?Opendocument.  See 
also infra text accompanying notes 65–66 (discussing the “too much work” principle). 
 23. Except perhaps insofar as the other constitutional claims incorporate components associated 
with First Amendment analysis into their own doctrine. 
 24. See supra text accompanying note 14.  See also Galina Krasilovsky, A Sculpture is Worth a 
Thousand Words:  The First Amendment Rights of Homeowners Publicly Displaying Art on Private 
Property, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 521 (1996) (discussing related hypotheticals).  Cf. Jefferson 
Muzzles, THE THOMAS JEFFERSON CTR. FOR THE PROT. OF FREE EXPRESSION, http:// 
www.tjcenter.org/muzzles/muzzle-archive-2010/#item03 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (describing actions 
by Chicago City Council member James A. Balcer in directing that a mural painted on the wall of a 
building owned by a private entity be painted over because the mural, which depicted three police 
cameras “emblazoned with . . . a crucified Christ, a deer head, and a human skull [was] a threat to this 
community”). 
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public policies, and advanced those policies with a fair degree of precision.25  If the 
city failed to come up with justifications of the required strength, the ban should be 
held unconstitutional, and the First Amendment found to both cover and protect the 
Oldenburg sculptures.26  By contrast, if the city banned the display of 
nonrepresentational art in places where drivers, for example, might see it, on the 
grounds that drivers, puzzled by what they view, might be distracted, the regulation 
would probably be content-neutral.  And the regulation would be justified if the 
city’s concern about driver distraction is reasonably well founded and the ban is 
reasonably well suited to achieving the goal of limiting distractions.27  The 
Oldenburg sculptures would then be covered, but not protected. 
B.  WHY THE COVERAGE QUESTION IS PUZZLING:  COMMUNICATION THROUGH 
ART AND OTHERWISE 
Of course nonrepresentational art is “communicative” in some sense, although 
one of the aspects of nonrepresentational art is that what it communicates often 
depends almost entirely on what a viewer believes it to be communicating.  Yet, 
many other activities are communicative in that way, and we should be wary of 
dismissing questions about the First Amendment’s coverage of nonrepresentational 
art because, being communicative, the art is “obviously” covered by the First 
Amendment.28 
Consider several examples.  William Carlos Williams prescribed how a poet 
should proceed when he wrote, “No ideas but in things.”29  Poets, he believed, 
should convey ideas through the “things” they described.30  For Williams, then, at 
least some “things” could convey ideas—the things described in poems.  But, if 
those things convey ideas when described in poems, why should we not think that 
they might also convey ideas when encountered in the physical world?  Marcel 
 
 25. Such a conclusion is not inevitable.  The canonical formulation for identifying covered 
expression that receives a low level of protection against content-based regulation comes from 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).  Such expression “by [its] very utterance inflict[s] 
injury . . . [and] [is] no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and is] of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.”  Id. at 572 (citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 
150 (1941)).  “Ugly” art might be said by its very appearance to inflict injury and, as I discuss in greater 
detail below, the assertions that art is “part of [an] exposition of ideas” or is “a step to truth” are 
extremely difficult to defend.  Id.  See also Hamilton, supra note 4 (arguing for First Amendment 
protection for nonrepresentational art). 
 26. For a general discussion of architectural regulation, see Haws, supra note 4. 
 27. I say “probably” because there is an argument that the distraction occurs because drivers are 
trying to figure out what the sculpture means and that the regulation is therefore content-based.  See City 
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (addressing and rejecting a similar argument). 
 28. Cf. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (“It is possible to find some kernel of 
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for example, walking down the street or 
meeting one’s friends at a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within 
the protection of the First Amendment.”). 
 29. William Carlos Williams, A Sort of a Song, in 2 THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WILLIAM 
CARLOS WILLIAMS 1939–1962 55 (Christopher McGowan ed., 1991). 
 30. Or, in the advice given to budding writers, “Show, don’t tell.” 
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Duchamp’s “Fountain” is a thing that he used to convey an idea by placing it in an 
unexpected context; why might it not be communicative in other contexts?31 
 
 
Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917) 
Philadelphia Museum of Art (original lost) 
 
Panhandling communicates something to those who observe a panhandler.32  
Some will say, “See that?  It shows how shiftless and irresponsible some people 
are;” others will say, “See that?  It shows how terribly thin our social safety net 
is.”33 
Ticket scalping presents a similar case.34  Some will see a ticket scalper as a 
 
 31. Consider the account of shaming sanctions as a mode through which the community 
expresses its disapproval of a target’s conduct, sometimes by actions rather than words or symbols.  See, 
e.g., Dan Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996).  For additional 
discussion, see text accompanying note 66 infra. 
 32. To focus on the more substantial questions, I put aside, as a distraction, the fact that some 
panhandlers (contingently) sit with signs saying “Homeless and Out of Work” and the like, or utter 
words in asking for money. 
 33. As the Second Circuit stated when it held unconstitutional New York’s ban on begging in 
Loper v. New York City Police Department, “Begging frequently is accompanied by speech indicating 
the need for food, shelter, clothing, medical care or transportation. Even without particularized speech, 
however, the presence of an unkempt and disheveled person holding out his or her hand or a cup to 
receive a donation itself conveys a message of need for support and assistance.”  999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 34. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927) (invalidating an antiticket scalping law as a 
violation of economic due process).  I doubt that anyone thinks that the decision has any precedential 
value today.  Then-Professor Robert Bork raised the question of ticket scalping in connection with a 
discussion of the First Amendment in a law school class or examination nearly thirty years ago.  I gave 
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demonstration of unregulated capitalism’s vibrancy, providing opportunities for 
entrepreneurial types to start a small business and make a good living, while others 
will see the same activity as a demonstration of the failure of unregulated 
capitalism, which allows the “greedy” to exploit the “needy.”  And again, to state 
the obvious, the interpretations people give to panhandling and ticket scalping 
might have effects on the political choices they make.35 
C.  APPLYING THE COVERAGE/PROTECTION DISTINCTION:  A CASE STUDY 
Consider Kleinman v. City of San Marcos.36  Judge Jones provided a crisp 
statement of the facts: 
Appellant Michael Kleinman operates Planet K stores throughout the San Antonio and 
Austin areas.  Planet K stores are funky establishments that sell novelty items and 
gifts.  Kleinman has a tradition of celebrating new store openings with a “car bash,” a 
charity event at which the public pays for the privilege of sledgehammering a car to “a 
smashed wreck.”  The wrecks are then filled with dirt, planted with vegetation, and 
painted.  Placed outside each store, the ‘planters’ serve as unique advertising devices. 
An Oldsmobile 88 car-planter was created upon the opening of a new Planet K store 
in San Marcos, Texas.  Kleinman arranged to have the smashed car planted with a 
variety of native cacti and painted with scenes of life in San Marcos.  Positioned in 
front of the store, the distinctive planter is visible to motorists traveling north on 
Interstate 35.  Kleinman did not dictate the content of the illustrations, but he 
requested that the phrase “make love not war” be incorporated into the design.  Two 
local artists, Scott Wade and John Furly Travis, were commissioned to paint the 
wreck.  At trial, Travis testified that he had no particular message in mind when he 
painted the car, “just happiness.”  He intended his images to convey the idea that “you 
could take a junked vehicle, junk canvas, and create something beautiful out of it.”  
Wade sought to transform “a large gas-guzzling vehicle’ into ‘something that’s more 
respectful of the planet and something that nurtures life as opposed to destroys it.”  
Wade explained that his intent was to describe American car culture and the link 
between gasoline and the war in Iraq.37 
 
what I describe below as a nominalist response, which I now think inadequate. 
 35. I do not think that distinguishing between panhandling and ticket scalping as “activities” and 
artworks as “things” works for the purposes of analyzing their First Amendment coverage or can bear 
much, if any, weight.  The distinction leads to the odd result—one inconsistent with existing doctrine—
that Stravinsky’s music for “The Firebird” is covered by the First Amendment, but the ballet performed 
to that music is not. 
 36. 597 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 159 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 324–25.  I take it that the dealer’s sponsorship of the artwork was inspired, perhaps 
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Car/cactus planter in Kleinman v. City of San Marcos (Austin Chronicle, Sept. 19, 2008) 
Photo:  Jana Birghum 
 
Footnote 37 continued 
 
Cadillac Graveyard 
Photo:  Matthew Spiel 
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The city had an ordinance declaring “junked vehicles” a public nuisance.  Such 
vehicles were defined as “self propelled, inoperable, and . . . wrecked [or] 
dismantled, . . . [or] inoperable for more than 45 consecutive days.”38  The city 
defended the ordinance against Kleinman’s First Amendment challenge on the 
ground that it was a content-neutral regulation aimed at eliminating eyesores and 
promoting public order.39  The court of appeals expressed some skepticism about 
Kleinman’s claim—accepted by the city for purposes of litigation—that “this 
cactus planter” was an artwork.40  According to the court of appeals, Hurley’s 
discussion of artworks “refer[red] solely to great works of art.”41  The court further 
stated that the “heavy machinery of the First Amendment” ought not “be deployed 
in every case involving visual non-speech expression.”42  Before finding that the 
ordinance survived intermediate First Amendment scrutiny, the court strongly 
suggested that the ordinance could be applied to the car if it was a “reasonable state 
regulation”:  “Irrespective of the intentions of its creators or Planet K’s owner, the 
car-planter is a utilitarian device, an advertisement, and ultimately a ‘junked 
vehicle[,]’” and those “qualities objectively dominate any expressive component of 
its exterior painting.”43 
Intermediate scrutiny was appropriate if the vehicle were treated as an artwork 
because the ordinance was “a content-neutral health and safety regulation,” “not 
intended to regulate ‘speech’ at all.”44  Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court 
held that the regulation “protect[ed] the community’s health and safety from the 
problems created by abandoned vehicles left in public view.”45  Junked vehicles 
were “an attractive nuisance to children,” and attracted “[r]odents, pests, and 
weeds” as well.46  The ordinance stated that junked cars caused “urban blight” and 
vandalism and depressed property values, and the court found that enforcing the 
ordinance against Kleinman would alleviate these social problems.47  Further, the 
ordinance was “reasonably tailored,” because owners of junked vehicles could keep 
them on their property if the vehicles were enclosed.48 
Some aspects of Kleinman are clearly questionable, particularly the court’s 
effort to distinguish between great works of art and other (“mere”?) artworks.49  I 
 
 38. Id. at 325 (citing SAN MARCOS, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34.196(a)).  The ordinance 
inevitably calls to mind the famous hypothetical ban on “vehicles in the park,” and invites us to consider 
whether the ordinance should have been construed not to apply to Kleinman’s wrecks.  See H. L.A. Hart, 
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.REV. 593, 607 (1958). 
 39. Kleinman, 597 F.3d at 324. 
 40. Id. at 326. 
 41. Id. at 327. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 326–28. 
 44. Id. at 328. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 328–29. 
 49. And yet the Visual Artists Rights Act provides a right against destruction of “work[s] of 
recognized stature.”  17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2010) (emphasis added). 
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suspect that drawing a line between covered and uncovered “visual non-speech 
expression” would be impossible, at least without invoking content-related criteria.  
Nor is it clear that one can describe something as an eyesore without making a 
content-based judgment, as indeed the apocryphal comment on Jackson Pollock’s 
paintings that, “My six-year-old could do that,” suggests.50 
 
 50. Similarly, negative effects on property values occur (if they do) because of viewers’ adverse 
reactions to seeing the display. A look at the Planet K location suggests that the diminution in property 
values would likely be low.  See Planet K Texas—San Marcos, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (search “Planet K loc: 910 N Interstate 35, San Marcos, TX 78666”).  But see 
Young v. Am. Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72 n.34 (1976) (upholding the regulation of adult 
entertainment clubs on the basis of their secondary effects on the neighborhood, while acknowledging 
that those secondary effects occur as a result of the cognitive effects the clubs have on their patrons). 
The court did not explain why the car/planter was “a utilitarian device.”  It was clearly not usable as an 
automobile.  Further, it is generally agreed that items with “ordinary” uses can also be works of art.  See, 
e.g., furniture company Knoll’s classic Saarinen “womb chair” both in its ordinary use and when placed 
in a museum: 
 
 
See also Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).  Finally, the 
suggestion that the car/planter was “an advertisement” rather than a work of art seems misguided.  In a 
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Putting aside those aspects of the court’s opinion, its perhaps grudging 
application of intermediate scrutiny seems defensible.  The ordinance is a content-
neutral regulation of an activity that is not necessarily expressive but happens to be 
expressive in this case.  The doctrinal standard for determining whether a First 
Amendment claim is valid comes from United States v. O’Brien:  Does the 
ordinance “further[] an important or substantial governmental interest . . . unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression,” and is “the incidental restriction on alleged 
First Amendment freedoms . . .  no greater than is essential to the furtherance of 
that interest”?51  My aim here is not to provide an analysis of those questions, but 
rather to observe that if artworks like those displayed by Kleinman are covered by 
the First Amendment, the conclusion that the ordinance can be applied to them 
notwithstanding his First Amendment claim amounts to a conclusion that the 
artwork is covered by the First Amendment, but, in this instance, not protected by 
it.52 
My aim in this Essay is to explore the First Amendment’s coverage of art, 
leaving aside questions about the circumstances under which art, if covered by the 
First Amendment, is also protected by it. 
D.  WHY THE QUESTION OF COVERAGE CANNOT BE FINESSED 
We might be tempted to finesse the question of coverage by attacking the 
problem from two different directions, which I label the “rationality” challenge and 
the “content-neutrality” challenge.  If successful, the combination of attacks would 
make the coverage question uninteresting. 
The rationality challenge deals with regulations of artworks that are based on the 
works’ content—their ugliness, for example.53  The attack asserts that the grounds 
for such regulations are typically so weak that the artworks would be protected by a 
substantive due process requirement that exercises of government power must be 
minimally rational.  Yet, even a reasonably robust rationality requirement—more 
robust than the current Court seems likely to apply—will be unable to finesse some 
seemingly content-based regulations.54  In my view, a ban on displaying offensive 
artworks on property visible to the public, for example, would almost certainly 
satisfy even a robust rationality requirement.  In such a case we would have to 
 
footnote, the Kleinman court observed that it did “not reach the City’s contention” that the car/planter 
was regulable as commercial speech. 597 F.3d at 327 n.5.  Print newspapers contain advertisements to 
increase the newspapers’ profitability, and those advertisements are pretty clearly covered by the First 
Amendment.  Cf. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (providing First Amendment 
protection to a political advertisement printed in a newspaper). 
 51. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 52. I note that some might reasonably think the claim that a work of art—even “Cadillac 
Graveyard”—lowers local property values is a weak one, and that the asserted interests in protecting 
property values and neighborhood aesthetics are not substantial enough. 
 53. Here, too, the label “transgressive” suggests why some might be motivated to regulate certain 
artworks. 
 54. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (law drawing distinctions between 
employees to deny retirement benefits to certain classes of railroad workers rationally related to purpose 
of phasing out “windfall” benefits). 
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decide whether artworks are covered. 
Yet, calling regulations based on ugliness or the like, “content-based” might 
prejudice the inquiry in favor of finding coverage.  The reason for regulation is an 
aesthetic judgment about which people will, of course, differ.  In this, though, the 
reason for regulation seems indistinguishable from all sorts of morality-based 
legislation, which in most instances are constitutional simply because they reflect 
moral judgments.55  In the absence of other reasons for thinking artworks are 
covered by the First Amendment, why should aesthetic judgments be different from 
moral ones for purposes of constitutional law? 
Consider another version of this approach.  Sally Mann’s photographs of her 
daughter are undoubtedly disturbing.  They induce thoughts—or better, inchoate 
feelings, a sense of unease—about childhood sexuality.56 
 
 
Sally Mann, Virginia in the Bed 
 
Yet they are not examples of child obscenity under current definitions.57  Nor could 
 
 55. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (“That the Judaeo-Christian religions oppose 
stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent with the 
Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny.” (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
442 (1961))). 
 56. Reynolds Price, Photographer:  Sally Mann, TIME MAGAZINE, July 9, 2001, at 77 (“Mann 
recorded a combination of spontaneous and carefully arranged moments of childhood repose and 
revealingly—sometimes unnervingly—imaginative play.”). 
 57. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 n.2 (1989) for the general statutory language 
of child obscenity laws: 
Whoever, either with knowledge that a person is a child under eighteen years or while in 
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the photographs be criminalized in a statute that was not unconstitutionally 
overbroad—but in large part the expansiveness would result from the assumption 
that art is covered by the First Amendment.58  Suppose a state sought to create a 
separate offense that would criminalize Mann’s photographs.  We could not avoid 
the coverage question with the contention that, like every statute legislatures might 
enact that penalized works of art as such, this one would surely be unconstitutional 
on rationality grounds.  The state interests in ensuring the portrayed child’s consent 
to a depiction that will permanently be available and that might lead the child, once 
grown, to be ashamed of what she might then perceive as her immodesty should be 
sufficient to satisfy the mere rationality requirement.59  
Kleinman offers a version of the “content-neutrality” attack.  Here the 
temptation is to assert that every content-neutral regulation applied to every 
artwork will survive constitutional scrutiny.60  The governmental interest will be 
strong and the incidental impact on speech will be weak, or so this attack hopes.  If 
so, the distinction between coverage and protection would be irrelevant in practice 
with respect to content-neutral regulations because artworks, even if covered by the 
First Amendment, would never be protected by it against content-neutral 
regulations. 
Of course it is easy to come up with examples of content-neutral regulations that 
can be applied to artworks without violating the First Amendment.  The most 
obvious cases involve performance artworks that violate ordinary criminal statutes.  
Performance art that takes the form of defacing public or private property or 
interacting with unsuspecting and unwilling bystanders in ways that amount to 
technical assaults, for example, is clearly not protected by the First Amendment 
because the government interest embodied in general criminal law is substantial 
and excising all artworks from the coverage of those laws is impracticable.61  Other 
 
possession of such facts that he should have reason to know that such person is a child under 
eighteen years of age, and with lascivious intent, hires, coerces, solicits, or entices, employs, 
procures, uses, causes, encourages, or knowingly permits such child to pose or be exhibited in a 
state of nudity, for the purpose of representation or reproduction in any visual material, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than ten nor more than twenty 
years, or by a fine of not less than ten thousand nor more than fifty thousand dollars, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
(citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (2011)). 
 58. For a discussion of the scope of child obscenity statutes, see id. 
 59. But cf. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (adopting a historical test for 
determining when some legislatively created category of speech is permissibly outside the First 
Amendment’s coverage, but reaffirming the constitutionality of creating a category of child pornography 
that did not fit within the historically identified categories). 
 60. Content-neutral laws are sometimes described as laws of general application that in some 
applications directly affect speech activities.  See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 
(1986) (“[N]either the press nor booksellers may claim special protection from governmental regulations 
of general applicability simply by virtue of their First Amendment protected activities.”). 
 61. The reference here is to “punking” as performance art.  See Punked, URBAN DICTIONARY, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=punked (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).  Definitions 1 (“A 
way to describe someone ripping you off, tricking you, teasing you”) and 5 (“What Ashton Kutcher says 
that makes all the hilarious pranks he pulls on celebrities suddenly okay”) are especially applicable.  
Regarding the criminalization of particular forms of art, the latter condition is needed to show that the 
application of the general criminal law to the artwork has no greater impact on expression than is 
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plausible examples, though, can place under pressure the conclusion that it will 
always be unproblematic to apply content-neutral regulations to works of art.  
Consider several examples.  First, historic preservation and environmental 
regulations apply to works by Christo and Jeanne-Claude.62  With a building 
owner’s permission, those artists wrap buildings in cloth for short periods, thereby 
altering the facades in a manner that might well be found to be inconsistent with an 
especially stringent historic preservation ordinance. 
 
 
Chisto and Jeanne-Claude, Wrapped Reichstag 
National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., Photo: Wolfgang Volz 
 
The temporary nature of their installations means that the works will have only a 
modest impact on the interests served by historic preservation ordinances.  Perhaps 
the interest in historic preservation should prevail over the artistic work, but we 
should not prematurely rule out the possibility that the First Amendment ought to 
make it unconstitutional to apply such an ordinance to one of these wrappings.  
Yet, by assuming that the First Amendment test—used when content-neutral rules 
affect covered activity—will always allow regulation—that is precisely what this 
 
necessary. 
 62. They have had to navigate the shoals of environmental protection regulations for permission 
to install some of their other works.  For a brief discussion of some of these difficulties, see Kriston 
Capps, Recognizing Jeanne-Claude, THE AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.prospect.org/ 
cs/articles?article=recognizing_jeanne_claude.  One can imagine stringent applications of environmental 
protection regulations that would bar the installations in a way that would only modestly protect the 
environment against permanent damage. 
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attempt to finesse the issue of coverage does. 
Next, consider the application of ordinary consumer fraud rules to the following 
hypothetical problem.  A museum dedicated to the history of the Middle East 
advertises an exhibition, “Jerusalem 1947.”  A visitor pays the admission fee and is 
outraged upon discovering that the exhibition consists solely of a large painting 
titled, Jerusalem 1947, which consists of a red square with a yellow border in the 
style of Josef Albers or Mark Rothko, with preliminary drawings.  Alleging 
consumer fraud, the visitor sues for a refund of the admission fee and other 
damages.  Assume that the visitor can satisfy the ordinary requirements for a fraud 
action, such as reliance and a departure from what a reasonable consumer would 
take the advertisement to assert.  The museum defends itself on the ground that the 
First Amendment defeats the fraud action.  If the First Amendment covers 
nonrepresentational art, I think the defense is far from frivolous.63 
Consider finally the problem posed by panhandling and ticket scalping.  
Undoubtedly we could deal with First Amendment objections to regulations of 
those activities by finding them covered by the First Amendment but (almost) 
never protected by it.64  Yet, I have the sense that the covered-but-not-protected 
argument is too much work to solve what should be a fairly easy problem.  In 
general terms, the “too much work” principle is put in play when one needs a 
complicated analysis to reach an answer that intuitively seems so obvious that a 
simple analysis should suffice.65  Assassination provides a standard example of the 
“too much work” problem in connection with finding an activity covered but not 
protected.  Another example would be legally unauthorized shaming sanctions— 
such as “tagging” an offender’s car or home with spray painted squiggles—that are 
imposed by a community vigilante group.  The fact that the shaming sanction is 
expressive should not require additional work to explain why the state can 
permissibly subject the vigilantes’ actions to punishment.66  Were these arguments 
 
 63. The case differs from Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), where the newspaper 
defendant’s First Amendment defense to a content-neutral breach of contract action failed.  There, the 
newspaper promised confidentiality to a source, then breached the promise.  In the hypothetical 
“Jerusalem 1947” case, the museum’s defense is that the First Amendment requires that it be treated as 
having delivered what it promised, an exhibition on Jerusalem 1947. 
 64. Perhaps regulations aimed at “aggressive” panhandling define the offense as they do because 
of concerns that “mere” panhandling—that is, a nonaggressive request for money—is both covered and 
protected by the First Amendment.  Compare Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding, against a First Amendment challenge, a city ordinance prohibiting aggressive panhandling, 
while noting that the city emphasized that the ordinance permitted a large amount of passive 
panhandling), with Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 157 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding 
ban on panhandling and begging in city subways, “[a]ssuming arguendo that begging and panhandling 
possess some degree of a communicative nature”).  Similarly, absent First Amendment concerns, 
busking could readily be dealt with under ordinary regulations directed at obstructions of the sidewalks, 
which apply to setting up tables outside restaurants and to busking. 
 65. I do not know of previous usages of the term for this phenomenon in the legal literature, but I 
would not be surprised to learn that other scholars have used other terms for the same idea.  For myself, 
I came up with the term on analogy to Bernard Williams’s famous “one thought too many” argument 
against a large number of approaches to practical reasoning about moral questions.  See BERNARD 
ARTHUR OWEN WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK:  PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973–1980, 18 (1981). 
 66. Various expressions by Supreme Court justices suggesting that expansive definitions of the 
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to arise because we somehow had to figure out a way to deal with odd cases on the 
margin, we might tolerate them.  But, here, they arise because we have simply 
assumed, without much analysis, that artworks are covered by the First 
Amendment.67 
We will often, but, not always, be able to put the question of coverage aside by 
finding an artwork unprotected even if covered by the First Amendment.  The 
question of coverage remains independently important. 
E.  THE INUTILITY OF “INTENT” AS A STANDARD FOR COVERAGE 
A common suggestion is that art is covered by the First Amendment because 
artists intend to communicate or express something, though with 
nonrepresentational art determining what they intend to express is notoriously 
difficult.68  An “intent” criterion is both over and underinclusive.  That is not 
enough to disqualify it, because every individual criterion for identifying what falls 
within a legal category has that characteristic.69  But, specifying the problems of 
mismatch yields additional insights into some of the problems of art’s coverage 
under the First Amendment. 
 
First Amendment’s coverage ought to be rejected even when the activities are found to be covered but 
not protected, suggest some implicit sense that the “too much work” principle should come into play.  
See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (“[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to 
be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we 
view it as only marginally so.”); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 462 U.S. 288, 301 (1984) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (“It trivializes the First Amendment to seek to use it as a shield in the manner 
asserted here,” that is, to claim that the activity of sleeping overnight in national parks is covered by the 
First Amendment).  The intuitions behind these expressions are, I think, that using standard First 
Amendment analysis to reach the conclusion that the activities involved are properly subject to the 
regulations at issue requires too much work. 
 67. Martha Minow pointed out in comments on an earlier version of this Essay that the problem 
here may be one of conceptual leakage.  Having assumed coverage and then routinely found lack of 
protection, we may run across a problem where applying the usual First Amendment standards would 
lead to protection in a context where that result seems mistaken.  She suggested that the leakage problem 
is particularly troublesome in settings involving commercial speech and copyright. 
 68. For a discussion of the Court’s effort to deal with this difficulty by relying on viewers’ 
interpretations rather than creators’ intentions, see infra text accompanying notes 165–66. 
 69. Indeed, any list of criteria will yield some overinclusive and underinclusive outcomes, and the 
true question is whether the degree of fit between the criteria (taken cumulatively), and the purposes the 
classification is designed to serve, is “good enough.” 
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David Rolland Smith, Cubi XXVIII (1965) 
Photo:  Bromirski 
 
To begin, many modern sculptors would deny that they “intend” to express 
anything in their work.  Rather, they seek to explore the relation between shape and 
space, nothing more (or less).70  Nor, as the epigraph from Archibald MacLeish 
suggests, is the abjuration of any intent to express limited to sculptors:  Artworks 
“should not mean but be.”  Consider the work known colloquially as “Whistler’s 
Mother.”  Its creator gave it the title, “Arrangement in Grey and Black” (with the 
subtitle “The Artist’s Mother,” added to satisfy perceived audience demand), to 
emphasize that his interest lay less in rendering his mother’s appearance accurately 
than in exploring the possibilities of a limited palette of color.71  Art as form—
 
 70. See text accompanying note 99 infra (discussing site-specific artworks). 
 71. See JAMES MCNEILL WHISTLER, THE GENTLE ART OF MAKING ENEMIES 127–28 (1890) (“Art 
should . . . stand alone, and appeal to the artistic sense of eye or ear, without confounding this with 
emotions entirely foreign to it.”  And asserting of the work’s title, “Now that is what it is.  To me it is 
interesting as a picture of my mother; but what can or ought the public to care about the identity of the 
portrait?”). 
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being rather than meaning—is not intended to communicate, even though it may 
sometimes do so. 
 
 
James McNeill Whistler, Arrangement in Black and White: The Artist’s Mother (1871) 
Musée d’Orsay, Paris 
 
A related point is that sometimes artworks are engagements with a tradition.  As 
such, it is not clear that they “mean” anything.  Consider here whether Picasso’s 
reimagining of Velazquez’s “Les Meninas” could mean, “I am a Spanish artist 
greater than Velazquez.”72 
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Pablo Picasso, Les Meninas (Group) (1957) 
Museu Picasso, Barcelona 
 
 72. For the original: 
 
 
Velazquez, Les Meninas (The Maids of Honor) (1656) 
Museo del Prado, Madrid 
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Consider next nonartistic activities intended to express something.  The ticket 
scalper may be a libertarian, and indeed may say to purchasers that she is scalping 
tickets as a way of subverting the regulatory state.73  I doubt that her intent to 
express her libertarian views through the act of ticket scalping should bring this 
activity under the First Amendment’s coverage.74  The justifications for bans on 
ticket scalping might be sufficient to satisfy the demands of modern substantive 
due process in the economic domain.75  Placing the libertarian ticket scalper under 
the First Amendment would seem to require at least a tiny increment in the 
justification for regulation, and I wonder whether the justifications for bans on 
ticket scalping could survive even an extremely modest demand for a bit more 
justification.76 
Finally, consider a parent who uses reasonably forceful methods of disciplining 
his children in public, with the intent to demonstrate—express to those who happen 
to see it—his view that such methods are better than less coercive “modern” 
parenting methods.  Here, too, I doubt that the presence of an intent to express 
something ought to change the analysis we would otherwise use.  The parent might 
be able to raise a modern substantive due process claim resting on family 
autonomy, but, as with the libertarian ticket scalper, I doubt that the disciplinarian 
parent should benefit from some increment in protection because of the intent to 
express something.77 
 
 73. Cf. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding the conviction for distributing a 
handbill of a person whose handbill on one side advertised a tour of a submarine for which a fee had to 
be paid, and on the other a protest against the city’s regulatory system for its wharfs).  See also Post, 
Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 15, at 487–88 (“The value of autonomy is 
potentially at stake whenever human beings act or speak, which implies that virtually all government 
regulation is potentially subject to constitutional review [under the First Amendment].  This is the 
essential vice of Lochnerism.”).  I believe that the bracketed insertion captures Post’s thought more 
accurately than the sentence as published. 
 74. Cf. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011) (“[T]he fact that a 
nonsymbolic act is the product of deeply held personal belief—even if the actor would like it to convey 
his deeply held personal belief—does not transform action into First Amendment speech.”).  Obviously, 
the word “nonsymbolic” distinguishes this statement from the issue discussed here. 
 75. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 76. For the seemingly applicable standard, see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 
(1989) (content-neutral regulations must be “narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental 
interest”).  The weakness of the justifications offered to defend ticket scalping bans against a substantive 
due process attack suggests that the interest at stake might not be “significant,” and a complete ban on 
ticket scalping might not be narrowly tailored in light of the possibility of limiting the ticket scalper’s 
profit to some (small) multiple of the ticket’s face-value.  But see id. at 782–83 (“The requirement of 
narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial government interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.”). 
 77. In comments on an earlier version of this Essay, Glenn Cohen raised the question of whether 
the First Amendment requires that expressive activity be exposed to someone other than its creator.  For 
example, could the parent claim First Amendment coverage for discipline conducted in private?  Given 
that the parent can claim a constitutional right of parental autonomy for private discipline, the question 
becomes this:  Assuming that the government’s justification for regulation overcomes that parental 
autonomy claim, what additional justification might be required to overcome the First Amendment 
claim?  My sense is that the First Amendment claim would be overcome by exactly the same 
government justifications as the parental autonomy claim would be, in which case the parent has no 
(effective) First Amendment claim—or, put another way, the private activity is not covered by the First 
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These examples bring the “too much work” principle into play.  Confronted with 
the argument that some criteria for bringing art under the First Amendment would 
also bring other activities under it, some respond that those activities should be 
covered, but that doing so will pose no particular difficulties because the relevant 
First Amendment analysis will show that regulating those activities is permissible 
even when regulating art is not.  The “too much work” principle concedes the 
possibility, but then observes that reaching the presumably acceptable outcome 
requires too much analytic work (and that if the same outcomes are always reached, 
bringing the activities under the First Amendment seems pointless).  The proposed 
criteria are in fact not general ones, but are jerry-rigged to achieve the desired result 
of covering art without providing any incremental protection to those other 
activities.78 
F.  THE ATTRACTIONS AND PERILS OF NOMINALISM 
Perhaps we can begin to make some progress by a rather nominalist approach: 
The First Amendment is about speech and the press—about words.  Perhaps we 
should take words, or “word equivalents,” as the starting point for thinking about 
nonrepresentational art and the First Amendment.79  The role of words and word 
equivalents is inevitably complex.  Treating words as necessary for First 
Amendment coverage will rule out coverage for much nonrepresentational art and 
leads to results that clearly seem wrong in some instances.80  Treating words as 
sufficient is more promising, yet sometimes will seem to find coverage for the 
wrong reasons.  In addition, we can observe a tendency for judges to treat words as 
sometimes meaningless.  Finally, treating the reproduction of words as something 
covered by the term “press” in the First Amendment leads to odd results as well.  
 
Amendment but only by the parental autonomy right, such as it is. 
 78. In correspondence, Corey Brettschneider suggested that we could resolve the “too much 
work” problem by holding that the First Amendment covers artworks, but protects them less vigorously 
than it protects political or other traditional forms of high-value speech.  Email from Corey 
Brettschneider, Assoc. Prof. of Politics, Brown Univ., to author (Dec. 4, 2010, 09:28 EST) (on file with 
author).  This suggestion raises a number of important questions of First Amendment theory, too many 
to be explored in detail here.  For example, the high-value/low-value distinction currently tracks the 
covered/uncovered distinction, but Brettschneider’s suggestion would create a third category of covered-
but-less-protected material, opening up the possibility that First Amendment doctrine should be 
structured with numerous layers each receiving its own level of protection.  For now, my primary 
observation is that Brettschneider’s suggestion would raise questions about the degree of protection to 
be afforded to works of imaginative literature such as Ulysses. 
 79. I develop the idea of “word equivalents” in more detail below, see infra text accompanying 
notes 95–96, but for present purposes it is enough to characterize them as works to which a viewer can 
give propositional content.  An example is provided by Chief Justice Rehnquist’s observation that a 
protestor’s burning of an American flag “obviously did convey Johnson’s bitter dislike of his country.”  
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 431 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  The flag-burning is a word 
equivalent with the propositional content, on the Chief Justice’s interpretation, “I bitterly dislike this 
country.” 
 80. In addition, imputing word equivalents to nonrepresentational art is almost certainly a fool’s 
errand.  I discuss questions raised by such imputation in more detail below.  See infra text 
accompanying note 99. 
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Addressing these questions provides a pathway into a deeper understanding of the 
problems with which this Essay is primarily concerned. 
1.  Are Words Necessary? 
I think it is fair to assume that political commentary lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment.  The word “commentary” suggests the use of words—as of course 
does the word “speech.”  One might think, then, that on strictly textualist grounds 
words might be a necessary component of material covered by the First 
Amendment.81  This will of course leave much outside that coverage—including 
Jackson Pollock’s paintings. 
This textualism seems difficult to defend.  As the Oxford English Dictionary 
indicates, commentary can take many forms.82  Wholly apart from the fact that the 
First Amendment might well cover more than political commentary, some political 
commentary occurs without words. 
 
 





 81. For a discussion of supplementing a textualist focus on words (“speech”) with a textualist 
focus on mechanical reproduction (“press”), see infra text accompanying note 98. 
 82. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry for the word “commentary,” under 
definition 3.b., indicates:  “Anything that serves for exposition or illustration . . . .” might be considered 
commentary (with the following example:  “How excellent a Commentary This [Nature] is on the 
Former [the Scriptures]”).  3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 551 (John Simpson & Edmund Weiner 
eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
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What matters, it seems, is that, a large number of viewers will impute roughly the 
same political content to an image.83  Words might not be necessary for First 
Amendment coverage, but perhaps a reasonably widespread imputation of roughly 
the same meaning is.  This suggests why ticket scalping is outside the First 
Amendment’s coverage:  Some viewers may indeed impute political meaning when 
they observe a ticket scalper, but any such imputation will not be widely enough 
shared to bring the activity within the First Amendment.  Yet, this approach will 
still not explain why Pollock’s Blue Poles, No. 11 is covered by the First 
Amendment.  It is entirely unclear whether anyone imputes any meaning to the 
painting, much less a political meaning, and whatever meanings are imputed are 
unlikely to be shared widely enough to make the painting a word equivalent. 
2.  Are Words Sufficient? 
Any acceptable account of the First Amendment’s coverage would have to 
ensure that political cartoons fall within the Amendment. 
 
 
Benjamin Franklin, Join, or Die (1754), as published in the Pennsylvania Gazette 
 
The images in such cartoons are inextricable from their political content—and yet 
sometimes the images would not be understandable as political without 
accompanying words.  The image of a severed snake in what may be one of the ten 
most famous American political cartoons might well be meaningless, or “only” an 
image, without the caption “Join, or Die.”  Perhaps we should conclude that the 
 
 83. For the doctrinal basis for this suggestion, see infra text accompanying notes 167–68 
(discussing Hurley). 
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First Amendment covers art that is accompanied by words.84 
 
 
Jenny Holzer, Installation for Guggenheim Museum Bilbao (1997) 
 
That conclusion would not explain why nonrepresentational art—art without 
accompanying words or word equivalents—is covered.  Even more, though, it is 
plainly overbroad.  Jenny Holzer’s installations are made up of words in 
illuminated neon “signs.”85  Yet, one errs in paying too much attention to the words 
that flow through the installations.86  The art lies in the words’ visual impact and, 
perhaps, in the cognitive disjuncture between the visual appearance and the 
meaning observers find themselves almost compelled to impute to the words they 
are seeing.87  If there are reasons for including these works of art within the First 
 
 84. One obvious advantage of doing so is that the First Amendment unquestionably covers 
Joyce’s Ulysses even if that work has many meanings, few of which are political. 
 85. The quality of the reproduction used here is not high; three of the neon signs in the 
reproduction read “I CRY OUT,” but I cannot decipher the words on the fourth. 
 86. I realize that this interpretation of Holzer’s work may be controversial, with other 
interpretations stressing the importance of the words themselves.  Despite these interpretations, my view 
nevertheless holds that the particular words Holzer uses are not integral to the work’s force. 
 87. Similarly with Renè Magritte’s The Treachery of Images: 
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Amendment, the fact that they employ words is not one of them.88 
In addition, a focus on words may be underinclusive. Sometimes images without 
words will convey meaning because the images have so often been associated with 
specific words that they become the equivalent of words.  Think of the donkey and 
elephant as symbols of the Democratic and Republican parties.  The images have 
no intrinsic meanings, and there surely are depictions of donkeys and elephants that 
have no political content.  But, deployed in political cartoons, the images have 
propositional content. 
Nonconstitutional law already responds to the fact that images can take on 
meanings independent of words.  A purely symbolic image can be protected by 
trademark law when it acquires a secondary meaning—a regular association in 
viewers’ minds between the image and the product to which it is implicitly but, 
importantly, not openly attached.89  Perhaps nonrepresentational art is covered by 
the First Amendment on similar grounds:  Even if not word equivalents, and 
therefore not fairly encompassed within a purely textualist analysis, enough people 
 
 
Rene Magritte, The Treachery of Images (1928–1929) 
Los Angeles County Museum of Art 
 88. For a discussion of the reasons I have illustrated Holzer’s work with a site-specific 
installation, see infra text accompanying note 98. 
 89. Note, though, that when coupled with Hurley’s correct insistence on the multivocality of 
some covered material, the various interpretations viewers give a group’s inclusion in a parade, see infra 
text accompanying notes 165–66, this argument for First Amendment coverage of nonrepresentational 
art threatens the trademark law of secondary meaning itself.  The person who infringes a secondary 
meaning trademark by taking advantage of the image’s multivocality has produced material that, on this 
argument, is covered by the First Amendment.  A descriptive term—and, by inference, an image—may 
be registered as a trademark only if it has “become distinctive of the applicant’s goods.”  15 U.S.C. § 
1052 (f) (2006) (emphasis added).  See also Park ‘n Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189 (1985). 
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may impute some meanings, and not entirely idiosyncratic ones, to such artworks.90 
A textualist insistence that words’ presence is either sufficient or necessary for 
First Amendment coverage thus seems mistaken, and unable to account for the 
coverage of nonrepresentational art.  Perhaps the textualist analysis can be salvaged 
on second-best grounds:  Textualism’s insistence that words are both necessary and 
sufficient for First Amendment coverage is indeed arbitrary with respect to any 
purposes we might impute to the Amendment, but it is better than any alternative in 
defining that coverage.  Arbitrary inclusions (e.g., Jenny Holzer’s work) and 
arbitrary exclusions (e.g., Jackson Pollock’s work) are the inevitable result.  
Perhaps so, but recall that we began with Hurley’s assertion that Jackson Pollock’s 
paintings were unquestionably covered.  The textualist analysis cannot 
accommodate that assertion, or the clearly widespread intuition that it is correct. 
What is at work in these arguments is a sense—not more than that—that First 
Amendment coverage turns on treating covered material as somehow equivalent to 
words.  Many of the moves I have identified seek to convert nonrepresentational art 
into word equivalents.  What, though, if even words might be meaningless? 
3.  Can Words Be Meaningless? 
One notices an interesting trope when reading Supreme Court opinions dealing 
with words that some Justices find troubling:  A Justice will note the words and 
assert puzzlement at what they mean, or otherwise deprecate the words’ 
communicative effectiveness.  Probably the most prominent example is Justice 
Blackmun’s description of Paul Cohen’s display of the words “Fuck the Draft” on 
his jacket as an “absurd and immature antic” and “mainly conduct, and little 
speech.”91  More recently, the Court called the words “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” 
“cryptic.”92  Importantly, the Court noted that the words might be interpreted 
differently by different people:  “It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing 
to others . . . . [School] Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by 
those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use, and that interpretation is plainly a 
reasonable one.”93 
 
 90. As discussed above, a finding of coverage is not the same as a finding of protection, and 
perhaps the infringer can invoke the First Amendment because the image is covered by it, but is not 
protected by the First Amendment because trademark law survives the appropriate level of scrutiny, 
especially when the protection afforded by trademark law to images with secondary meaning is defined 
with sufficient narrowness.  The structure of the argument is familiar from copyright law.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 104–05.  Yet, as before, this analysis seems to me susceptible to the “too much 
work” critique:  We should be able to establish the conclusion with a less elaborate argument. 
 91. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  The characterization 
Justice Blackmun offered seems to me obviously inapt.  Of similar import, but not referring to actual 
words, is Chief Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of a flag-burning as “the equivalent of an 
inarticulate grunt or roar.”  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 432 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 92. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007). 
 93. Id. 
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Clay Good, Untitled Photograph of Bong Hits 4 Jesus banner (2002) 
 
Here, again, multivocality enters the analysis.  A “reasonable” imputation of 
meaning to otherwise meaningless words—or symbols—is sufficient to trigger 
First Amendment coverage.94  Word equivalents arise when there is enough 
convergence in viewers’ understandings of an activity’s meaning for the activity to 
function as shorthand for words expressly setting out that meaning.95  Perhaps 
some viewers would be puzzled at the meaning of burning a flag, but enough 
people will impute identical meanings to the act for it to count as a word 
equivalent.96 
I wonder whether many works of nonrepresentational art are word equivalents, 
at least if the threshold for determining sufficient convergence in imputed meaning 
among viewers is more than just a bit above the ground.  Is that threshold satisfied 
by whatever meanings viewers impute to Blue Poles, No. 11?  More troubling, 
perhaps, is this question:  Is the threshold satisfied by the meanings readers give 
the last line of James Joyce’s Ulysses?97  Or is it enough that every reader gives 
 
 94. Note that in trademark law invented words can become trademarks.  Do consumers and 
competitors have a First Amendment right to use “to xerox” as a synonym for “to use a photocopying 
machine” or “onesies” as a synonym for “one-piece infant sleepwear” (before the words become generic 
and lose trademark protection), because they reasonably impute those meanings to the words? 
 95. An analogy here might be to the visual appearance of an English word transliterated into 
Greek script (but not translated into Greek).  An example:   (“soccer” transliterated; the Greek 
word for soccer is ποδόσφαιρο).  THE POCKET OXFORD GREEK DICTIONARY 488 (J.T. Crisp ed., rev. ed. 
1995). The Greek “word” might be meaningless as a Greek word but could be the equivalent of the 
English word to someone who knows the Greek alphabet but not Greek. 
 96. The criteria for determining when “enough” viewers converge on a meaning should, I think, 
be relatively weak, so that truly idiosyncratic meanings are excluded but odd ones are not. 
 97. “I was a Flower of the mountain yes when I put the rose in my hair like the Andalusian girls 
used or shall I wear a red yes and how he kissed me under the Moorish wall and I thought well as well 
him as another and then I asked him with my eyes to ask again yes and then he asked me would I yes to 
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some meaning to the last lines even though there may be no significant 
convergence among readers on what that meaning is? 
4.  The Special Question of Reproductions 
The question about Ulysses leads to another possibility.  Switch from the Speech 
Clause to the Press Clause, and think in purely textualist terms.98  Books are 
covered by the Press Clause because they are printed by presses.  So are books 
containing pictures, and so, therefore, are books containing depictions of 
nonrepresentational art. 
This gets us something, but not nearly enough.  Even with respect to words, this 
invocation of the Press Clause ends up protecting books but not the manuscripts 
submitted to publishers.  With respect to art, the Press Clause protects 
reproductions but not the originals.  And, this might be consequential if, for 
example, the government were able to seize the film on which a photograph is 
imprinted before the film is transmitted for reproduction.  Perhaps more interesting, 
the approach leaves uncovered some of the artworks most likely to be the subject of 
problematic regulation—site-specific works that might trigger environmental 
protection or historic preservation concerns. 
 
 
Robert Smithson, Spiral Jetty (1970) 
Photo: George Steinmetz 
G.  TWO ADDITIONAL PATHS TO AVOID IF POSSIBLE 
1.  Stipulating that Art is Covered 
Finessing the coverage question by moving directly to the protection question is 
impossible, and dealing with it through a nominalist approach seems troublesome 
as well.  Supreme Court doctrine on other First Amendment issues points out 
 
say yes my mountain flower and first I put my arms around him yes and drew him down to me so he 
could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will Yes.”  
JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 643–44 (Hans W. Gable ed., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1986) (1922) (This quotation 
is severely truncated.). 
 98. I mean to put aside here various originalist interpretations of the Press Clause, some of which 
treat the Clause as dealing solely with regulation of the mechanical means of reproducing speech.  See, 
e.g., Edward Lee, Guns and Speech Technologies:  How the Right to Bear Arms Affects Copyright 
Regulations of Speech Technologies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1037 (2009). 
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another possibility:  that is, to “solve” the problem by stipulation—by declaring 
that nonrepresentational art is categorically included or categorically excluded from 
First Amendment coverage, without further explanation. 
The Court has taken this path in two areas bordering on the issue with which I 
am concerned.99  After holding that commercial speech was not categorically low 
value, the Court defined commercial speech as speech that “concern[s] lawful 
activity and [is] not . . . misleading.”100  If misleading commercial advertisements 
were covered by the First Amendment, long-standing regulations of misleading 
advertising would be brought into question; this may have motivated the Court to 
exclude such advertisements from its definition of commercial speech.101 
Why, though, is the government entitled to label some advertisements as 
misleading and thereby exclude them from the First Amendment’s coverage?102  As 
the constitutional law of commercial speech has developed, the Court has 
increasingly emphasized that the government cannot prohibit commercial speech 
on the paternalistic ground that consumers given information by an advertisement 
will make imprudent choices.103  Yet, characterizing a facially truthful statement as 
misleading is just that sort of paternalism, expressing the government’s judgment 
that consumers—assisted by competitors’ counter-advertising and various forms of 
consumer-generated content such as Websites with product reviews—will be 
unable to determine for themselves the information’s accuracy or significance.  
Excluding misleading speech from the category of commercial speech covered by 
the First Amendment solves a difficult problem by stipulation. 
The Court has treated the First Amendment dimensions of copyright similarly.  
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to the 
Copyright Extension Act of 1998, holding that it was not different enough from 
prior copyright extension acts that it had upheld.104  In discussing the First 
Amendment claim, the Court alluded to exceptions built into the structure of 
copyright law itself.  Among those exceptions is the fair use doctrine.  The Court 
concluded that any First Amendment interest in using another person’s copyrighted 
words was “generally adequate[ly] . . . address[ed]” by “copyright’s built-in free 
speech safeguards.”105  Depending on what the Court meant by “generally 
adequate,” this may overstate the ease with which the First Amendment can 
accommodate copyright law.  The Eldred analysis suggests that banning “unfair” 
 
 99. For a discussion of why commercial speech and copyright border on the law of art, see infra 
text accompanying notes 209–10. 
 100. Central Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 101. For a discussion, see Rebecca Tushnet, Fighting Freestyle:  The First Amendment, Fairness 
and Corporate Reputation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1457 (2009). 
 102. In Central Hudson, the Court used the phrase “whether the expression is protected” to 
introduce its definition of commercial speech, but the sense of “protection” here is “coverage.”  447 U.S. 
at 566. 
 103. See especially 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (invalidating a ban 
on the advertising of liquor prices that the state had sought to justify by arguing that lack of information 
would reduce demand for liquor). 
 104. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 105. Id. at 221. 
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uses as defined in copyright law would not violate the First Amendment as 
interpreted outside the copyright context—that is, that unfair uses are defined so as 
to ensure that the high standards required for content-based regulations are 
satisfied.  Yet, this conclusion might not be warranted.  Two examples suggest 
why. 
The first is Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, which held a 
magazine liable for infringing a publisher’s copyright by embedding approximately 
300 words of the most newsworthy portions of Gerald Ford’s memoirs in a 2,250-
word article published two weeks before the book’s official release date.106  The 
Court held that this was not fair use.107  Second, in adopting the present version of 
the “fair use” rule in 1976, Congress had before it an “agreement” between authors, 
publishers and educators setting out guidelines for classroom copying.108  One 
apparently unfair use is the planned (i.e., not spontaneous) classroom distribution 
of copies of a complete short poem, defined as “less than 250 words” and “printed 
on not more than two pages.”109  “Spontaneous” is defined as a decision to 
distribute the poem occurring “so close in time” to “the moment of its use for 
maximum teaching effectiveness . . . that it would be unreasonable to expect a 
timely reply to a request for permission.”110 
In both examples, the justification for allowing the imposition of liability for 
unfair use is to ensure that authors and publishers have sufficient incentives to 
produce copyrightable material in the first place.  As Harper & Row put it, 
copyright was intended to be “the engine of free expression.”111  It is not clear that 
ordinary First Amendment standards applicable outside the copyright context 
would make it permissible to impose liability for the publication of newsworthy 
material (e.g., a tort action claiming that the publication cast the subject in a false 
light or nonspontaneous distribution of complete short poems in an action seeking 
damages for injury to reputation).112  One could reasonably question whether the 
incentive-based justification for imposing liability is sufficiently strong to satisfy 
 
 106. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 107. Id. at 540. 
 108. AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68–74 (1976).  The precise status of this agreement is unclear, 
although some courts have relied on the guidelines to define fair use.  See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. 
Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390 (6th Cir. 1996).  The agreement seems to have been 
intended as a safe harbor for uses described as fair by the guidelines; whether the agreement was 
intended to serve as a delimitation of uses that would not be fair remains controversial. 
 109. AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68 (1976). 
 110. Id. at 69. 
 111. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
 112. I have in mind “confessional poetry,” of which Sylvia Plath’s “Daddy” is an example.  Some 
confessional poems might identify a person with sufficient specificity to make a claim of reputational 
damage entirely plausible.  The development of online permissions systems might reduce the time 
needed to obtain permission to the point where no distribution could fairly be called spontaneous.  For a 
more extended discussion of why “copyright’s built-in safeguards” might not be sufficient to satisfy 
noncopyright based First Amendment requirements, see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:  How the 
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 548 (2004). 
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standards applicable outside of copyright, such as the “compelling interest.”113  In a 
similar vein, one could also question whether the standards for determining when 
uses are fair are sufficiently well defined to satisfy ordinary notice standards 
applicable in other First Amendment areas.114  Perhaps more important, the 
incentive-based justification for imposing liability explains why we are engaged in 
“restrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others,” which, in other contexts we have been told “is [a practice] 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”115  The tenor of copyright doctrine, I 
think, is that the main aspects of copyright law simply cannot violate the First 
Amendment—a classic solution by stipulation. 
I do not mean to assert that stipulated solutions are always undesirable.  
Stipulated solutions may sometimes be inevitable, as when the problems posed are 
so intractable that integrating a doctrinal solution to a particular problem into the 
general body of First Amendment law is extremely difficult.  Choosing such a 
solution, however, should be a last resort. 
2.  Balancing 
The same can be said of a second path for avoiding the problems of determining 
why nonrepresentational art is covered by the First Amendment.  That path uses a 
standard balancing analysis that makes all of the considerations discussed 
throughout this Essay relevant to determining the questions of coverage and 
protection, and trusts the good sense of legislators, administrators and judges to 
arrive at sensible solutions.  Some performance artworks would not be covered, 
some would be; some that are covered would be protected, and, depending on the 
exact contours of the problems presented, others would not be.  A Christo-Jeanne-
Claude wrapping might be prohibited if it threatened “too much” environmental 
damage, or if the temporary wrapping of a historic building posed “large enough” 
risks of permanent damage to the building’s exterior, but not if the environmental 
threat or the risk to the building’s exterior was “small enough.” 
Balancing tests are familiar in First Amendment law.  They tend to have an air 
of disrepute about them because they are thought by many to give insufficient 
guidance ex ante to people hoping to engage in activity that they believe to be both 
covered and protected by the First Amendment.  For this reason, it is helpful to try 
to pin down, with as much precision as possible, doctrinal alternatives to the 
balancing test, even though in the end we may end up concluding that balancing is 
 
 113. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254–56 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning 
whether the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act could be justified on incentive grounds). 
 114. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 
1692–94 (1988); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair:  A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 1137, 1137 (1990) (“It is de rigueur to begin a scholarly discussion by quoting one of the judicial 
laments that fair use defies definition.”). 
 115. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).  For a discussion using this observation to 
challenge Buckley’s correctness, see Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law:  
What Copyright Has in Common with Campaign Finance Reform, Hate Speech and Pornography 
Regulation, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001). 
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the best we can do.116 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE ASSUMPTION THAT 
ART IS COVERED 
A.  WHY WE ASSUME THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT COVERS ART 
I suspect that we assume that even nonrepresentational art should be covered by 
the First Amendment for several reasons.  First, because we think that such art is, in 
some sense, a “good thing.”117  But of course not all good things receive 
constitutional protection.118  And perhaps more interestingly, some contemporary 
artists defend their work on the ground that it is transgressive, meaning that it 
implicitly rejects prevailing standards for determining what fits with the class of 
good things—and suggesting that defenders of the status quo might have legitimate 
reasons, from their own point of view, to regulate or suppress such works.119 
As suggested earlier, we may also assume that nonrepresentational art is covered 
by the First Amendment because we find it hard to imagine circumstances under 
which governments would try to regulate it; the coverage question, we might 
assume, is otiose.120  Perhaps MacLeish’s statement about poems should be given a 
different meaning from the one ordinarily given it:  Nonrepresentational art exists 
for its own sake  (unlike ticket scalping), which is why governments rarely try to 
regulate it.121  In addition, the answer to the coverage question has implications for 
other problems.  For example, if nonrepresentational art is not covered by the First 
Amendment, questions about government subsidies for some artworks but not 
others become relatively easy, and we need not take the First Amendment into 
 
 116. For a good recent discussion concluding that an eclectic approach to coverage is the best we 
can do, see R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First Place?:  Determining the Scope of 
the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010). 
 117. Justice Souter properly included “Arnold Schoenberg’s music” in his list of “unquestionably” 
covered works because most of the issues discussed in this Essay arise in connection with instrumental 
music, especially nonprogrammatic instrumental music.  Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569.  For that reason, 
although I agree that tensions between the way in which we think about words and the ways in which we 
think about images have some bearing on this Essay’s deeper implications, I do not think that the 
distinction between words and images can do all the explanatory work.  See Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a 
Thousand Words:  Copyright Law Outside the Text (125 HARV. L. REV., forthcoming Feb. 2011).  For 
one of the few efforts to analyze music’s First Amendment coverage, see David Munkittrick, Music as 
Speech:  A First Amendment Category Unto Itself, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 665, 668 (2010). 
 118. Chocolate ice cream, for example. 
 119. For a discussion focusing primarily on art and secondarily on the law, see ANTHONY JULIUS, 
TRANSGRESSIONS:  THE OFFENSES OF ART 222 (2003).  Some recent controversies, such as the 
withdrawal for city subsidies from the Brooklyn Museum after it exhibited Andres Serrano’s “Piss 
Christ,” demonstrate that some works of transgressive art succeed in that ambition.  See generally 
Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Sci. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), for a 
discussion of the controversy. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 17–18. 
 121. I owe this suggestion to Rebecca Tushnet.  For an example of government regulation of art as 
such, see Kleinman v. City of San Marcos, 597 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir. 2010).  See also supra notes 36–
48 and accompanying text for discussion of the same. 
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account in determining whether one person’s reproduction of an artwork violates 
another’s rights under copyright or trademark law.122  And, of course, the a fortiori 
argument made in Hurley would be unavailable; the case’s reasoning would have to 
be reconstructed.123  In the other direction, if nonrepresentational art is covered by 
the First Amendment, we must face some difficult questions about copyright law 
and the law of trademark tarnishment. 
Another reason for thinking that the First Amendment covers art is that we know 
from the nominalist view that the First Amendment is about communication, and 
we think that art communicates as well.  However, this is a logical fallacy:  That 
the First Amendment covers some things that communicate does not imply that it 
covers all things that do so.  In addition, “communicate,” in its use in the First 
Amendment context, is a transitive verb.  Speech covered by the First Amendment 
communicates something.  In contrast, what art communicates is often quite 
unclear. 
B.  PROBLEMS FITTING ART’S COVERAGE INTO PREVAILING FIRST AMENDMENT 
THEORY 
The questions that animate this Article can be put in this way:  Exactly how is 
nonrepresentational art different—for First Amendment purposes—from 
panhandling and ticket scalping?124  How is nonrepresentational art similar to core 
examples of political speech clearly covered by the First Amendment? 
Alexander Meiklejohn’s treatment of art indicates why the first question is 
interesting and difficult.  Meiklejohn offered a general account of freedom of 
speech as a protection for “those activities of thought and communication by which 
we ‘govern.’ Self-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the 
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare 
that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”125  Yet, “there are many 
forms of thought and expression within the range of human communications from 
which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human 
 
 122. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585–88 (1998).  See also Eugene 
Volokh, Intellectual Property Law and the First Amendment, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 1377 (Leonard Levy & Kenneth Karst eds., 2000). 
 123. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 124. Busking combines artistic performance (usually musical) with panhandling.  Compare SEIU 
v. City of Houston, 542 F. Supp. 2d 617 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (upholding an antibusking ordinance against a 
First Amendment challenge, finding the ordinance to be content-neutral and adequately justified), with   
Hobbs v. Cnty. of Westchester, 397 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding against a First Amendment 
challenge a county’s executive order barring a busker, previously convicted of child molestation, from 
child-oriented performances on public property).  The Court of Appeals found the order content-neutral 
and sufficiently justified (the busker there made balloon animals).  These cases suggest a pattern in 
which activities such as panhandling and ticket scalping are held covered by the First Amendment, but 
that regulation of those activities (almost) certainly satisfies the applicable First Amendment standards.  
For a discussion of whether that pattern can provide the basis for a general approach to 
nonrepresentational art and the First Amendment, see supra text accompanying notes 60–61. 
 125. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 245 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1961). 
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values.”126  These include “[l]iterature and the arts,” which “lead the way toward 
sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the values out of which the 
riches of the general welfare are created.”127  He continued, “the novel is at present 
a powerful determinative of our views of what human beings are, how they can be 
influenced, in which directions they should be influenced by many forces, 
including, especially, their own judgments and appreciations.”128  We might 
wonder whether nonrepresentational art could be described in similar terms.  Even 
if it could, we should note that the characteristics relevant to governance that 
Meiklejohn identifies in novels also characterize panhandling and ticket scalping.  
To extend this theory, governance-relevant views can be shaped by running a small 
business.  We might require that governments provide some reason for requiring 
that specific businesses be licensed, but we surely do not want to subject licensing 
requirements to even a modest increment of required justification—of the sort dealt 
with through the doctrine dealing with content-neutral regulations—because 
running a small business is governance-relevant.  Finally, governance-relevant 
learning can occur by reading a novel or by observing a panhandler or a ticket 
scalper.129 
The widely used metaphor of the marketplace of ideas shows why the second 
question is interesting and difficult.  Archibald MacLeish’s assertion that “a poem 
should not mean but be” suggests that art is not “about” ideas nor does it “convey” 
or “express” them.130  What “idea” does Jackson Pollock’s Blue Poles: No.11 
convey?  Even more, what idea does Ulysses convey?  “Human experience is 
wondrously various,” perhaps.  But then, I would think that panhandling and ticket 
scalping convey that idea as well.131 
The most prominent general “theory” of the First Amendment runs into 
difficulty in explaining art’s coverage.132  Autonomy-related theories are both 
 
 126. Id. at 256. 
 127. Id. at 257. 
 128. Id. at 262.  Cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (referring to “the 
subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all artistic expression”). 
 129. Meiklejohn seems to argue that the First Amendment protects art because of its effects on the 
viewer, not because producing art has the effects he describes on the artist.  Compare Hold Fast Tattoo, 
LLC v. City of North Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 2d 656, 662 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (holding that the act of 
tattooing is not an act protected by the First Amendment), with Dawson v. Del., 503 U.S. 159, 165 
(holding that the admission into evidence of the content of the defendant’s tattoos to show his 
association with the Aryan Brotherhood violated his First Amendment rights).  I discuss the possibility 
of distinguishing between the arts and panhandling by providing a narrow definition of what Meiklejohn 
calls “the range of human communications,” see infra text accompanying note 137.  See also supra note 
35. 
 130. The observation that MacLeish “asserted” this in a poem is commonplace in commentary on 
it.  See, e.g., Michael J. Cummings, Ars Poetica (Macleish):  A Study Guide, CUMMINGS STUDY 
GUIDES, http://www.cummingsstudyguides.net/Guides5/ArsPoetica.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2011).  I 
use this citation to illustrate how banal the observation has become. 
 131. In referring to Meiklejohn and the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor I have introduced general 
First Amendment theory.  In general, though, I attempt in this Essay to avoid commitments to general 
theories of the First Amendment, relying instead on stated doctrine (which must of course be informed 
by theoretical presuppositions but works to some degree independently). 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 128–29. 
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promising and problematic.  They are promising because artistic expression is, in 
the Romantic tradition at least, precisely a way in which an artist lives 
autonomously; they are problematic as a way to distinguish artistic expression from 
essentially all other human activities, which can be ways in which people live 
autonomously.133  Perhaps not panhandling, but at least some forms of ticket 
scalping are autonomous expressions of the self, unless one stipulates that the 
market is not a domain for self-expression, as some autonomy theorists 
controversially do.134 
General First Amendment theories that do not invoke either politics or 
autonomy are hard to come by.  Jack Balkin argues that the First Amendment 
protects a domain in which a democratic culture, not confined to politics, can 
flourish.135  Balkin’s is a historicist approach to constitutional law, and like all such 
approaches it has difficulties connecting the descriptive with the normative.136  As 
applied to art, the argument goes something like this:  Nonrepresentational art falls 
within a category—artworks including works of imaginative literature—that 
today’s legal culture takes as contributing to a more general democratic culture.  
Further, today’s legal culture is inclined to use relatively large legal categories—
”artworks in general”—rather than smaller ones—”representational art” or “written 
literature”—for reasons familiar from discussions of the desirability of rules rather 
than standards.  For example, large categories provide better guidance to larger 
numbers of people, and are easier to administer for judges acting under substantial 
constraints of time and ability. 
But, precisely because Balkin’s argument must describe the legal culture as 
committed to a specific version of the “rules/standards” debate, it is vulnerable to 
the usual normative criticisms of all the positions taken in that debate, and to the 
additional historicist criticism that the existence of widespread controversy over the 
“right” way to think about the “rules/standards” question shows that today’s legal 
culture is not in fact committed to the use of large (as opposed to small) categories.  
Both the normative and historicist criticisms of Balkin’s position take on special 
force in dealing with questions—such as that of art’s coverage—that test the 
boundaries of the categories conventionally used.137 
 
 133. To similar effect, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN:  A FREE 
PRESS FOR A NEW CENTURY 46 (2010) (“Speech as a means of self-fulfillment and self-realization can 
be seen as too ill-defined for judges to work with comfortably, indistinguishable from other meaningful 
human activities . . . ”) (emphasis added). 
 134. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) (offering 
an autonomy-based account of freedom of expression that excludes from the First Amendment’s reach 
communications occurring in or driven by the market). 
 135. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:  A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004). 
 136. For an exposition of Balkin’s historicism, see JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION:  POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011). 
 137. Here, too, the claims made on behalf of transgressive art are relevant.  For a brief discussion, 
see supra text accompanying note 119.  A recently filed case challenging New York’s ban on 
commercial mixed martial arts performances raises similar questions.  See Dahlia Lithwick, First 
Amendment Smackdown, SLATE (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2011/11/is_there_a_first_amendment_right_to_beat_your_mma_opponent_senseless_.ht
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Similar difficulties attend Robert Post’s weakly sociologized account of art’s 
coverage.  For Post, art “fit[s] comfortably within the scope of public discourse,” 
which he defines as “all communicative processes deemed necessary for the 
formation of public opinion,” because it is a “form[] of communication that 
sociologically we recognize as art.”138  Given the existence of controversies over 
whether works like Cadillac Graveyard and Kleinman’s Planter fall within the 
category “art,” Post’s “we” must refer to something like, as I would put it, “a well-
informed and reasonably well-educated and sophisticated group of people who 
reflect on the nation’s commitment to free expression,” rather than, as one might 
otherwise think, “the people as represented in their legislatures.”139  As with 
Balkin, Post’s category is the relative large one of “art in general,” rather than 
“nonrepresentational art” or, perhaps, “art as understood by MacLeish.”140 
IV.  FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AND ART 
A.  THE SUPREME COURT ON ART AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The Supreme Court’s references to art in general, and to art that does not have 
propositional content apparent on its surface, have been remarkably casual.141  An 
early decision, since overruled, held that motion pictures were not covered by free 
speech principles.142  According to Justice McKenna, “the first impulse of the mind 
is to reject the contention” that “motion pictures and other spectacles” are covered 
by those principles.143  He acknowledged that motion pictures “may be mediums of 
thought,” but, he continued, “so are many things . . . [such as] the theater, the 
circus, and all other shows and spectacles.”144  Making and showing motion 
pictures was “a business, pure and simple . . . not to be regarded . . . as part of the 
press of the country, or as organs of public opinion.”145  As Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson held, the mere fact that an activity is conducted for profit cannot possibly be 
the basis for placing it outside the First Amendment’s coverage, but Justice 
McKenna’s reference to “organs of public opinion” might have become the basis 
for serious consideration of the First Amendment’s coverage of imaginative 
literature and nonrepresentational art.146 
 
ml.  One can imagine the plaintiffs’ lawyers saying, “What part of ‘arts’ don’t you understand?” 
 138. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech:  A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 
617, 621 (2011).  See also Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, supra note 15, at 486. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 140. Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech, supra note 138, at 620–21 (citing 
the film Brokeback Mountain as the core example, rather than, for example, Pollock’s Blue Poles No. 
11). 
 141. See also supra note 28 (discussing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)). 
 142. Mutual Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 241 (1915) (addressing the 
coverage of Ohio’s constitutional protection of speech and the press), overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. 
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
 143. Mutual Film Corp., 236 U.S. at 243–44. 
 144. Id. at 243. 
 145. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). 
 146. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“That books, newspapers, and 
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It was not to be.  In Winters v. New York, Justice Stanley Reed rejected the 
proposition that “the constitutional protection for a free press applies only to the 
exposition of ideas,” because “[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining 
is too elusive for the protection of that basic right.”147  He continued, “Everyone is 
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.  What is one man’s 
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine.”148  Here, too, we can glimpse the hint of a 
delineation of the First Amendment’s coverage:  Activities covered by the First 
Amendment must somehow teach doctrine or otherwise convey ideas even if they 
are not expositions of ideas.  It seems clear, though, that neither Justice Reed nor 
his colleagues saw that line.  Justice Felix Frankfurter, dissenting, observed almost 
off-handedly that “Keats’ poems [and] Donne’s sermons” are “under the protection 
of free speech,” not noticing that Donne’s sermons differ from Keats’s poems 
precisely in that the sermons are expositions of ideas whereas treating Keats’s 
poems as such expositions drains them of much of their essence.149 
It would be tedious to compile the passing references to the First Amendment’s 
coverage of undifferentiated categories of “art” and “literature,” coupled with 
mention of the ways in which some forms of art and literature can be, as Justice 
Reed said, propaganda or vehicles for ideas.  The culmination came in the Court’s 
efforts to define obscenity.  As the Court understood the problem, obscene 
materials lay outside the First Amendment’s coverage.150  That made identifying 
what was obscene critically important.  Throughout its efforts to define obscenity, 
the Court has simply assumed that material that can be described as sufficiently 
artistic cannot be obscene.151  Its assumption has been that art is presumptively 
covered by the First Amendment.  I suspect that the Court’s assumption was an 
 
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression 
whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”). 
 147. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 528 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  This is true even of poems that seem expressly at least 
partly didactic.  Consider what is lost in saying that the “point” of “Ode on a Grecian Urn” is “‘Beauty is 
truth, truth beauty,’—that is all/ Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.”  JOHN KEATS, Ode on a 
Grecian Urn (1820), reprinted in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF JOHN KEATS 185, 186 (1994) (Note that 
Keats has the urn itself “saying” this).  Here again this Essay’s epigraph from Archibald MacLeish is to 
the point.  See also Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2737 n.4 (2011) (“Reading 
Dante is unquestionably more cultured and intellectually edifying than playing Mortal Kombat.”).  I do 
not mean to minimize the difficulties in distinguishing between didactic imaginative literature—
“propaganda through fiction,” in Justice Reed’s words, see Winters, 333 U.S. at 510—and “mere” 
imaginative literature, and those difficulties might be sufficient to justify a decision not to draw a 
constitutional distinction between them.  But, that is a different rationale from the one the Court has 
offered. 
 150. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well 
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the . . . obscene . . . .”). 
 151. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) (“The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, 
literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection 
of freedom of speech and press.”) (emphasis added); Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“A state 
offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, 
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”) (emphasis added). 
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unconsidered result of the initial confrontation with works labeled obscene.  The 
celebrated cases, such as that involving Ulysses, involved serious written literature, 
readily enough characterized as covered by the First Amendment if only because 
the works used words.152  But, instead of treating the challenged works as (merely) 
written literature, the courts protected them because of what the courts called the 
works’ “artistic” value.153 Then they generalized from the category “written works 
with artistic value” to “all works, whether written or not, with artistic value,” 
without realizing that the elimination of words from the works ought to have 
triggered some thought about how such works could be described as “speech” or 
“press.”154 
That assumption underlies the Court’s most extended recent confrontation with 
the relation between the First Amendment and contemporary art.  In National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court tied itself into knots trying to figure out 
how to deal with a seemingly content-based rule for awarding federal subsidies to 
art.155  Suppose the Endowment decided not to provide a subsidy to Jackson 
Pollock.  The First Amendment aside, no one would worry about the grounds on 
which Congress decided to award selective subsidies.  Yet, how could we begin to 
think about the subsidy’s denial by invoking standard First Amendment doctrine 
about content-based regulations?156  For reasons the Court has never bothered to 
explain, the fact that something is denominated “art” changes the constitutional 
landscape dramatically. 
B.  DOCTRINAL BUILDING BLOCKS 
The Supreme Court has given us three building blocks for understanding why 
nonrepresentational art is covered by the First Amendment.  The first is the Hurley 
case in which Justice Souter declared that Jackson Pollock’s paintings were 
unquestionably covered by the Amendment.157  He found it necessary to make that 
statement because of the argument made by the respondents, a group of gay, 
lesbian and bisexual Irish Americans who wanted to participate in Boston’s St. 
Patrick’s Day parade, which was conducted by a private organization.158  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the parade was a place of public 
accommodation under the state’s antidiscrimination laws, and therefore could not 
 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 
1934). 
 153. See id. at 706 (describing Ulysses as having been “executed with real art”). 
 154. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (1973) (applying obscenity standards to “illustrated” 
material). 
 155. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).  A summary statement of the contortions is that the Court adopted an 
extremely strained interpretation of the relevant statute to enable it to characterize the statutory term 
“general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” as 
not content-based.  For a discussion of the case, see BEZANSON, supra note 4, at 7–49. 
 156. I put aside the possibility that the Endowment might deny the subsidy for reasons orthogonal 
to its interest in art; for example, on the (hypothesized) ground that Pollock was a Communist. 
 157. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995). 
 158. Id. at 559–61. 
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exclude gay, lesbian and bisexual individuals because of their sexual orientation.159  
The parade organizers contended that a rule requiring that they make the parade 
available to gay, lesbian and bisexuals individuals violated their First Amendment 
rights.160  The state trial court found, however, that a parade, even one in which 
participants carried signs identifying themselves or otherwise making statements, 
did not convey a message.161 
Justice Souter replied that parades were for “marchers who are making some 
sort of collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way.”162  
What exactly was the point of the parade?  Whatever anyone may have imagined 
the point to have been, Justice Souter makes it clear that “a narrow, succinctly 
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection.”163  The parade’s 
organizers had “the autonomy to choose the content of [their] own message” even 
if that content was not readily articulable.164  But, if the organizers could not 
readily articulate what they meant by picking and choosing among applicants for 
places in the parade, how can we say that they had any message at all?  The answer, 
Justice Souter wrote, lay in the meaning observers would impute to participation: 
“[T]he parade’s overall message is distilled from the individual presentations along 
the way, and each unit’s expression is perceived by spectators as part of the 
whole.”165  Viewers seeing respondent’s banner might mistakenly infer that the 
parade’s organizers had no objections to the “unqualified social acceptance of gays 
and lesbians.”166 
Hurley implies that the First Amendment’s coverage depends on whether 
observers impute “meaning” to what they see.167  Note, however, that the 
“meaning” need not be univocal.  Some viewing the respondent’s banner in the 
parade might take it to indicate the sponsor’s indifference to homosexuality; others 
might take it to indicate the sponsor’s endorsement of homosexuality (as one 
among many); yet others might not find of any significance at all.  We might come 
up with some limits on the multivocality of objects covered by the First 
Amendment.  Rumsfeld v. FAIR suggests a “reasonable observer” standard:  The 
reasonable observer must understand that the object on view is expressive, though 
not all observers will agree on what it expresses.168  Perhaps an object to which 
 
 159. Id. at 563–64. 
 160. Id. at 564. 
 161. Id. at 562–63. 
 162. Id. at 568. 
 163. This is why Pollock’s paintings are covered by the First Amendment.  See id. at 569. 
 164. Id. at 573. 
 165. Id. at 577 (emphasis added). 
 166. Id. at 574–75.  The resonance between this approach and “reader-response” accounts of 
literature is clear.  For an annotated bibliography on reader-response theory, see Jane P. Tompkins, 
Annotated Bibliography, in READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM:  FROM FORMALISM TO POST-
STRUCTURALISM 233–72 (Jane P. Tompkins ed., 1980). 
 167. For an explanation of the scare quotes, see supra text accompanying note 13. 
 168. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (“FAIR”), 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) 
(distinguishing between “inherently expressive” conduct and other conduct, only the former of which is 
protected by the First Amendment, and observing, “An observer who sees military recruiters 
interviewing away from the law school has no way of knowing whether the law school is expressing its 
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only a handful of people impute “meaning” is not covered, and perhaps truly 
idiosyncratic imputations of meaning could be disregarded.169  This analysis has 
two attractive features.  It accounts for the intuition that nonrepresentational art is 
covered, because one feature of such art is that viewers impute “meaning”—indeed, 
many “meanings”—to it.  In addition, it accounts for the fact that the First 
Amendment’s coverage may change when enough people start to understand an 
object as “art” rather than, for example, immature scribblings. 
The second building block is Cohen v. California, which identifies the meanings 
that the First Amendment covers.170  The case’s facts are well known, as is its 
central rationale.  Cohen carried a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” written 
on the back.171  He was arrested for engaging in offensive conduct.172  As Justice 
John Marshall Harlan carefully explained, the case turned on whether the state “can 
excise . . . one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse.”173  The state 
argued that doing so did no damage to anyone’s ability to assert any proposition.174  
On the state’s view, Cohen could continue to assert, and write on his jacket, “Down 
with the Draft,” or “Abolish the Draft.”  But, Justice Harlan replied, those words 
meant something different from “Fuck the Draft”:  “much linguistic expression 
serves a dual communicative function:  it conveys not only ideas capable of 
relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as 
well.  In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive 
force.”175  Prior to Hurley, perhaps this building block might have been limited to 
cases in which the noncognitive component was attached to some distinctive 
cognitive one.176  But, Hurley’s endorsement of multivocality means that every 
form of expression has some cognitive content for some viewers or listeners.  
Cohen is thus available as a general building block. 
Here, then, is a second reason that the First Amendment covers 
 
disapproval of the military, all the law school’s interview rooms are full, or the military recruiters 
decided for reasons of their own that they would rather interview someplace else”).  See also First 
Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 610 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 2010) (relying on this 
passage to hold that a church’s activity in providing food to the homeless in a city park, while intended 
to communicate a message and understood by some viewers to do so, was not “truly communicative”). 
Consistent with the general pattern identified above, see supra note 124, on rehearing en banc, the 
Eleventh Circuit assumed that the activity was expressive but upheld the city’s prohibition of the 
distribution of food as “a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction.”  First Vagabonds Church of 
God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 761 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 169. What counts as “truly idiosyncratic” would have to be quite carefully specified.  It is a settled 
feature in novels dealing with serial killers that the killers can regard what they do as producing works 
of art, and the very fact that this is a settled feature shows that the imputation of artistry to killings is not 
idiosyncratic. 
 170. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 171. Id. at 16. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 22. 
 174. Id. at 26 (referring to “the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also 
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See BEZANSON, supra note 4, at 19–20 (suggesting that Cohen protects the noncognitive 
component only in relation to a cognitive one). 
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nonrepresentational art.  Cohen provides some reasons for rejecting a distinction, 
hinted at in some prior decisions, between activities that convey ideas and those 
that expound them, and hints even more mutedly at the possibility that the First 
Amendment covers works that expound but not works that convey ideas.177  The 
intuition is that nonfiction works expound ideas while works of imaginative 
literature (sometimes) only convey them.  So, it might be thought that 
nonrepresentational art might convey some ideas, but in general it does not 
expound them.  Cohen’s dismissive treatment of an asserted distinction between 
cognitive and noncognitive meaning suggests that the distinction between 
“conveying” and “expounding,” which parallels that distinction, will often be quite 
thin.  Paraphrasing Martin Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail can 
restate some of King’s ideas, but a paraphrase that strips King’s rhetoric from the 
Letter transforms its meaning.178  This phenomenon applies similarly, but perhaps 
to a greater extent, with poems, representational art and nonrepresentational art.179  
Absent Cohen, doctrine might need to be structured to deal with the question that 
we can put as, “Is the loss of meaning from paraphrase or restatement or statement 
(in the case of nonrepresentational art) small enough to make nonrepresentational 
art sufficiently similar to expository writing that it should be covered in the same 
way that such writing is?” 
Yet, perhaps that is the wrong way to think about the problem of art’s coverage.  
Cohen might be taken to reject the idea limned by MacLeish that artworks do not 
mean at all, but rather simply are.  For MacLeish, to state what artworks mean is to 
commit a category-mistake, to apply to artworks concepts suitable for something 
else but unsuitable for them.  If so, saying that artworks are covered by the First 
Amendment would be something like saying that dish detergent is covered by the 
First Amendment.  Despite the force of MacLeish’s insight, Cohen appears to reject 
it. 
So, Cohen suggests, nonrepresentational art has the noncognitive force 
associated with words.180  Indeed, nonrepresentational art’s multivocality might 
rest on its noncognitive force:  representational art, we might think, says something 
particular; nonrepresentational art “says” many things.181  “No ideas but in 
 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 149. 
 178. I thank Rebecca Tushnet for the example. 
 179. Consider here an analysis describing e.e. cummings’ “i sing of Olaf glad and big” as “a satire 
on war, patriotism and societies [sic] values.”  Lily Seabrooke, Poetry Analysis:  E.E. Cummings, 
HELIUM (March 19, 2008), http://www.helium.com/items/938079-poetry-analysis-e-e-cummings.  The 
statement is true enough in some sense, but obviously lacking a great deal. 
 180. Two observations here.  First, all words have noncognitive force, “Abolish the Draft” as 
much as “Fuck the Draft.”  The former, perhaps, conveys that the speaker has rationally considered all 
the relevant policies and has concluded in a dispassionate manner that the draft should be rejected as 
unsound public policy; the latter that the speaker is passionately committed to the draft’s abolition.  
Second, the presence of words is irrelevant to Justice Harlan’s point.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 82–83. 
 181. For myself, even the claim that representational art says something particular is questionable.  
For example, portraits are, in my eyes, quite frequently multivocal, like portraits by Ivan Albright: 
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thingstakes on another meaning:  Only things convey ideas fully fleshed out, 
because ideas expressed in words can be polluted by the noncognitive features of 
their precise mode of expression.  Things, in contrast, allow viewers to impute all 
possible noncognitive meanings to the ideas the things embody—and to choose for 
themselves which of those meanings makes the most sense for them. 
But, if Hurley’s emphasis on defining the First Amendment’s coverage with 
reference to the meanings viewers impute to covered material and Cohen’s 
emphasis on the noncognitive aspects of covered material explain why the 
Amendment covers nonrepresentational art, the two cases threaten to undermine the 
distinction between covered and uncovered material.  At the least, if enough people 
come to understand ticket scalping as a performance of opposition to the regulatory 
state, ticket scalpers might have a First Amendment defense to the prohibition of 
their activity.182  Perhaps more serious, Hurley and Cohen create what might be 
 
 
Ivan Albright, A Face From Georgia (1974) 
The Art Institute of Chicago 
 182. One might read the FAIR case as rejecting a First Amendment claim because the Court 
believed or assumed that not enough people would associate the presence of a military recruiter on a law 
school campus with a message that the law school approves of military recruiting generally or the then-
applicable “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.  See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional 
Rights (“FAIR”), 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006) (asserting that “a law school’s decision to allow recruiters on 
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thought of as a paradox in copyright law.  One standard defense of copyright 
against a First Amendment challenge is that copyright’s built-in limitations narrow 
its scope to the point where the incentive effects of copyright provide a strong 
enough reason to justify barring people from speaking (by infringing on others’ 
copyrights).183  One of those built-in limitations is that copyright protects the 
expression of ideas but not the ideas themselves.184  But, given Hurley and Cohen, 
it might seem that either nothing is copyrightable or everything is.  On the one 
hand, nothing, because ideas and expression—the cognitive and noncognitive 
aspects of expression—are inseparable:  You cannot copyright an expression 
without copyrighting precisely the idea that it expresses.  But, tweak the expression 
a bit—place an emphasis here rather than there—and you have another idea.  
Further, Hurley suggests that if enough viewers see complete copying as an 
expression around which the “infringer” has placed visible or invisible quotation 
marks, the quoted material expresses a different idea from the original.  On the 
other hand, everything, because “no ideas but in things” implies that every discrete 
object is simultaneously an idea and an expression of that idea. 
The possibility that explaining why the First Amendment covers 
nonrepresentational art could create chaos in our understandings of the Amendment 
is compounded by the Supreme Court’s third and most recent building block.  As 
noted earlier, one common method of evading questions of the First Amendment’s 
coverage lies in assuming that the regulated material is covered, but then observing 
that the regulation at issue is a general one not directed at speech.185  Restrictions 
on expression are incidental to the general regulation, and the regulation’s 
constitutionality is then said to turn on a relaxed standard of “intermediate 
scrutiny.”186  The Court’s recent decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
throws this analysis into question.187 
The case involved a federal statutory ban on supplying “material support or 
resources” in the form of “training,” “financial services” and some forms of “expert 
advice or assistance” to terrorist groups.188  As construed by the Court, the ban 
applied to training and the like that took the form of speech and nothing more.189  
 
campus is not inherently expressive”); id. at 65 (asserting that law students “can appreciate the 
difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits”).  Hurley, on which the 
Court in FAIR relied, suggests that the law school might have a substantial First Amendment claim were 
people to come to associate the presence of military recruiters with the law school as speaker. 
 183. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 n.8 (2001) (providing case support for the assertion “that First Amendment values 
are fully and adequately protected by limitations on copyright owner rights within copyright doctrine 
itself”). 
 184. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (“[A] copyright gives no exclusive right to the art 
disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.”). 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 186. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 702–03 (1986).  See also Turner Broad. Sys. v. 
F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“[R]egulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are subject 
to an intermediate level of scrutiny.”). 
 187. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 188. Id. at 2707–08. 
 189. Id. at 2724. 
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The government urged the Court to hold that the statute, taken as a whole, covered 
conduct, some of which took the form of speech.190  According to the government, 
in such cases the Court should treat the statute as content-neutral and apply 
intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the conduct-ban had an impermissible 
incidental effect on speech.191  Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court 
rejected that analysis, holding that the ban regulated speech on the basis of its 
content:  “Plaintiffs want to speak to [designated terrorist groups] and whether they 
may do so . . . depends on what they say.  If plaintiffs’ speech . . . communicates 
advice derived from ‘specialized knowledge’ . . . then it is barred,” but it would not 
be prohibited “if it imparts only general or unspecialized knowledge.”192  The 
government’s argument that the statute should receive intermediate scrutiny 
“because it generally functions as a regulation of conduct,” the Chief Justice wrote, 
“runs headlong into” Cohen v. California.193  A regulation is content-based “when 
the conduct triggering coverage . . . consists of communicating a message.”194 
Taken seriously, that standard would convert many regulations heretofore 
understood to be content-neutral—general regulations of land use, for example—
into content-based regulations when the regulated activity “communicates a 
message.”195  Taken together with Hurley and Cohen, Humanitarian Law Project 
implies that any activity that enough people regard as having some meaning, 
noncognitive as well as cognitive, must survive the highest level of scrutiny, 
because Hurley and Cohen tell us that those are the conditions for determining 
when something communicates a message.  San Marcos can regulate the car/cactus 
planter there only if it can show—as it almost certainly cannot—that its interest in 
avoiding unsightly displays that diminish property values and attract rodents is 
extremely strong and cannot be advanced by less restrictive methods, such as 
requiring fencing, explanatory placards and exterminators.196  Perhaps more 
important, looking at these building blocks all together rather strongly suggests that 
bans on misleading advertising are constitutionally suspect, particularly when the 
misleading nature resides in the advertising’s noncognitive aspects.197 
 
 190. Id. at 2723. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 2724. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) 
(relying on commercial speech doctrine to reject a First Amendment challenge to the application of an 
antidiscrimination ordinance to a newspaper’s separate listings of “Help Wanted – Male” and “Help 
Wanted – Female”).  I would think it clear that such a choice “communicates a message,” so that 
regulations that apply to this and similar forms of discrimination outside the commercial context would 
be subject to the stringent standard of review that content-based regulations receive. 
 196. See supra notes 34–49. 
 197. The classic example is bans on so-called “lifestyle” advertising for products, such as tobacco, 
the consumption of which poses risks to health and life.  Lifestyle advertising links consumption with 
lifestyles that the product’s producers believe consumers will find attractive. 
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C.  SOME IMPLICATIONS 
Much of the foregoing should probably be treated as an exploration of First 
Amendment theory with few practical implications.  Direct regulation of artworks 
as such is rare, and what exists almost always takes the form of content-neutral 
regulations that readily pass the relevant doctrinal tests.  Some questions of 
copyright and related intellectual property law, though, might be affected by 
resolving questions about art’s coverage under the First Amendment. 
Artworks (and music) are not uncommon objects of intellectual property 
litigation, probably because there is money to be made from reproducing 
copyrighted works without paying permission fees.198  As the Court has observed, 
copyright law—and associated intellectual property law—has built-in limitations 
structured to ensure that copyright law does not improperly limit free expression.199  
Among these are fair use, transformative use and parodic uses.200  These doctrines 
would not disappear were we to conclude that artworks were not covered by the 
First Amendment.  Their structure, however, might change.  Promoting free 
expression would become a policy goal, not a constitutional imperative, and the 
doctrines could be developed to accommodate the policy of free expression with 
other purely copyright-relevant policies.  At least around the edges, some uses that 
would not infringe copyright under a doctrine accommodating copyright policy and 
the First Amendment might be found infringing under a restructured doctrine:  
Mere policy goals surely ought to play a smaller role than constitutional 
imperatives when competing policies are accommodated. 
More interesting are some implications of finding artworks completely covered 
by the First Amendment.201  As just noted, intellectual property law has already 
accommodated the First Amendment to some degree.  Yet, full coverage suggests 
that some reproductions not protected by copyright and intellectual property 
doctrine would be protected by the First Amendment were artworks fully covered.  
Or, perhaps better, the analytic structure for dealing with intellectual property 
questions would change.  We would ask whether the legal rule sought to be 
invoked to impose copyright or similar liability is consistent with the First 
Amendment, rather than asking whether the reproduction fits within one of the 
built-in accommodations.202 
 
 198. For art, see, e.g,, Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (copying magazine 
photography for “high” appropriation art); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 
1996) (copying high art photography for movie poster).  For music, see, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that any sampling of a sound recording, 
no matter how de minimis or unrecognizable, is infringement); Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs 
Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (dealing with the musical similarity between “He's So 
Fine” and “My Sweet Lord,” without regard to lyrics).  Only some of these cases involve arguably 
“high” art.  The classic music-only infringement case not involving any similarity in lyrics, is Bright 
Tunes Music, 420 F. Supp. 177.  
 199. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 200. For a discussion of these built-in limitations, see id. at 219–20. 
 201. For a discussion of the distinction between full and less-than-full coverage, see infra text 
accompanying note 78. 
 202. This suggestion has been made before, though not in precisely these terms.  See, e.g., Mark A. 
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Consider a trademark dilution (“tarnishment”) action.203  Some visual artists 
create frames that, in their view, are integral parts of the works themselves.204 
 
 
Georges Seurat, Evening, Honfleur (1886) 
Museum of Modern Art, New York 
 
Suppose a museum curator wants to show how different frames affect the way 
viewers see and appreciate artworks.  She finds a work like Seurat’s and makes 
several reproductions of the scene depicted without obtaining permission to do 
so.205  She places each reproduction in a different type of frame:  An ornate wooden 
frame, an austere stainless steel one, no frame at all and the like.206  The show 
 
Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE 
L.J. 147 (1998); Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment 
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431 (1998). 
 203. For reasons already alluded to, devising an appropriate hypothetical is difficult. 
 204. I owe the following two examples to students in my Discussion Group on Art and the First 
Amendment, Harvard Law School, Fall Term 2010. 
 205. Prodded by a comment by Glenn Cohen, I put it this way to distinguish between an artwork 
defined as scene-plus-frame and a work defined as scene-placed-in-a-frame.  Cohen suggested another 
possibility:  Deliberately separating and rearranging the three components of a work designed as a 
triptych. 
 206. According to Judge Easterbrook, “No one believes that a museum violates [17 U.S.C.] § 
106(2) every time it changes the frame of a painting that is still under copyright.”  Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 
125 F.3d 580, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing copyright protection for “derivative” works). 
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“works” in the sense that the frames do change the visual experience.  But precisely 
because the new frames change the visual experience, the artist who painted the 
original might well object, arguing that the curator has damaged the artwork in a 
way analogous to trademark dilution.207  By contrast, the fact that the show 
“works” means that it affects enough viewers to satisfy Hurley’s audience-oriented 
test.  As a result, the museum would be able to claim First Amendment coverage 
for its show.  The only relevant question is whether the conditions for imposing 
liability conform to First Amendment requirements, not whether the show fits 
within a First Amendment-sensitive statutory scheme of liability. 
Or consider someone who buys a Katy Perry CD and makes a large number of 
copies, which he then packages in a jewel box whose cover art is of a sort 
associated with heavy metal.208  Hurley suggests that the seller could claim the First 
Amendment’s coverage if he can show that enough listeners or purchasers regarded 
the combination of cover art and music to convey a message different from Katy 
Perry’s original CD.  It is not clear that the combination fits comfortably within any 
of copyright’s accommodations of the First Amendment.  The “new” CD is 
probably not a fair use, nor is it a parody of Perry’s work, though the cover art may 
be a comment on her work.  The “too much work” principle suggests that it is 
better simply to ask directly whether the copier has a First Amendment right to do 
what he did. 
Of course most questions of tarnishment arise in connection with commercial 
speech.  It is easy enough to salvage the tarnishment cause of action from the First 
Amendment by observing that the First Amendment standard applicable to 
commercial uses that tarnish another’s product is different from, and more tolerant 
of regulation than, the standard applicable to noncommercial speech.209  Yet, as 
noted earlier, the Court has excluded misleading commercial speech from First 
Amendment coverage by stipulation.210  That may not be a stable position.  
Because speech that tarnishes is misleading or, at least, very much like misleading 
speech, instability in the Court’s commercial speech doctrine, coupled with open 
acknowledgement of art’s First Amendment coverage, might end up undermining 
the tarnishment cause of action. 
 
 207. One can tinker with the hypothetical to squeeze it into an existing trademark-dilution cause of 
action, but perhaps it is better to imagine that the artist could take advantage of some sort of moral rights 
cause of action.  Cf. Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2010) (giving 
creators of works of visual art the right “to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other 
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”).  Under VARA 
the question would be whether the alternative frames are a “modification of that work,” and it probably 
is not, although again tinkering with the hypothetical could make it so (emphasis added). 
 208. Katy Perry is a popular singer.  See James C. McKinley, Jr., Katy Perry Makes Some 
Billboard History (Aug. 17, 2011, 1:00 PM), N.Y. TIMES ARTS BEAT, http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/08/17/katy-perry-makes-some-billboard-history/; KATY PERRY OFFICIAL WEBSITE, 
http://www.katyperry.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2011). 
 209. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1997) (upholding the regulation of the use of 
trade names by optometrists because such names are potentially misleading). 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This Essay has raised questions about the First Amendment’s unquestionable 
coverage of nonrepresentational art.  Yet, those questions need not impair the 
conclusion that such art is indeed covered.  Combine a “family resemblance” 
argument with a “rules versus standards” argument and the questions raised here 
might receive entirely acceptable answers.  The “family resemblance” argument 
begins with the observation that we need not, and should not, develop a list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions to determine the First Amendment’s coverage.  
There may be a list of conditions, but we check off only some items on the list to 
determine that political cartoons are covered, other items to determine that song 
lyrics are covered, and so on for each candidate for coverage.  We find coverage if 
enough items are checked off.  Artworks are sometimes intended to communicate 
relatively precise messages; they are sometimes the object of suppression because 
of their assumed political content; they contribute something to the development of 
a democratic culture; and perhaps more.  In short, artworks bear a family 
resemblance to core political speech.211 
The “rules versus standards” argument begins with the observation that some 
artworks fit all the criteria one might develop for coverage, and others fit many.  
Distinguishing between artworks that satisfy enough of the criteria we might 
develop and those that do not is possible in theory, but it may well be beyond the 
capacity of ordinary legal decision makers to do so reliably across the range of 
problems they might encounter.  Given that there is “propaganda through fiction” 
and through some forms of representational art, it is better to have a rule that all 
artworks are covered.212 
I have no deep quarrel with these conclusions and so, no deep quarrel with 
Justice Souter’s statement in Hurley regarding First Amendment coverage for 
 
 211. Perhaps the “family resemblance” approach is sufficiently similar to Balkin’s 
conventionalism as to be vulnerable to the same kinds of criticism I leveled against it.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 136–37.  So, for example, questions about coverage might be raised in precisely 
those circumstances where many people do not see even a general family resemblance between the 
object in question and political speech.  An example might be some forms of performance art.  For what 
it is worth, I am inclined to think that the idea of a family resemblance relies on a certain kind of 
conventionalism about language, whereas Balkin’s approach relies on conventionalism about cultural 
products themselves.  But, the notion of family resemblances is notoriously slippery, and I do not want 
to commit too much of my argument to the proposition that artworks bear a family resemblance to 
political speech. 
 212. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 
136–37 (discussing the rules-standards question in connection with Balkin’s theory of cultural 
democracy).  I confess to the belief that the line-drawing exercise is not so difficult as to be beyond 
judicial capacity.  It seems to me easy to conclude that Spiral Jetty and David Smith’s sculpture, see 
supra text accompanying notes 69 and 98, are not propaganda through nonrepresentational art, and 
similarly with a great deal of such art (and nonprogrammatic music).  Put another way, I doubt that 
courts would inevitably do a bad job were they to try to develop categories smaller than “art” (and, just 
to be clear, the “rules/standards” literature shows that the possibility that one or a small group of art 
works would be misclassified is insufficient in itself to justify seeking larger rather than smaller 
categories). 
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Jackson Pollock’s paintings.213  But, this Essay has suggested that the First 
Amendment’s coverage of artworks either may rest on shaky foundations that 
ought to be shored up, or may have implications that ought to be explored more 
extensively than they have been. 
 
 
 213. I admit to a having a vague sense that it would be better to deny coverage to artworks, though 
I also have a sense that my motivation may be less anything specific about the First Amendment 
analysis of artworks than a generalized suspicion of doctrines that give the courts a larger role in our 
political order than they might otherwise have. 
